A portrait of the struggling life of Chiam Chong Chian

The following is a loose translation of the biography of Chiam Chong Chian, who was an underground CPM cadre leader in Malaya during the 1950s.

Born in Kuantan, Pahang, Malaya in 1931, Chiam Chong Chian was a Malayan son that died on PRC soil because of the tumultuous struggle for independence and the battle between nationalists and communism during the 1950s and 1960s.

Chiam was the third child in a Hainanese family of six children. His father came to Malaya at the end of the 19th century, first becoming a baker and later a plantation supervisor.

Chiam was only 11 or 12 when the Japanese invaded Malaya during WWII. During that time, Chiam followed his family to hide in jungle and began to lived off the land. He joined the adults in hunting, fishing and delivering supplies while entertainment was Chinese classic stories of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin.

In 1946, after the war had ended, Chiam returned to school in Kuantan and a year later enrolled in Chinese High Singapore. Not only were Chiam's results good, he was also charismatic and well-liked by fellow students. He was surrounded by a group of close friends who would later become his comrades. Many of these friends would later end up as liaison officials (with overseas Chinese) in China after the Chinese Communists took power.

1950 was a watershed year for Chiam who was senior high year 2. There was a surge in anti-colonial sentiments and seniors like him began to infect the younger ones in Chinese High with the need for Malaya's independence.

As the waves of anti-colonialism continued unabated, authorities began the clamp down of student activism with the closing of Chinese High, shutting down of student organizations, arresting progressive teachers and students and the expulsion of 50 senior high school student activists with Chiam being one of them.

On May 31, 1950, when military police surrounded the school to arrest them, Chiam was hidden in the school canteen by student sympathizers and managed to escape the school. As the surrounding area of Chinese High were houses of wealthy residents who typically employed Hainanese as housekeepers, Chiam was able to escape the dragnet by seeking help from his kinsmen.

From then on, Chiam bade farewell to his student life and joined the communist underground to battle against the British colonial power and achieve independence for Malaya.

In 1951, Chiam returned to Kuantan to teach in a primary school. He was humble, well-liked and earned the respect of the students. On the side, Chiam continued to work for the Communist Party of Malaya and received instructions to carry out reporting and research for the party.

In 1952, Chiam began to be tasked by the party to carry out organization work and operations. As he was passionate, responsible and honest, he was trusted by the party and began to take on more responsibilities. Under Chiam's leadership, the political environment began to open up and progress was made with mobilization of the masses.

In the early 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew began to work in cahoots with the British colonial power to exterminate the communists. Chiam was forced under these circumstances to escape to Indonesia.

When in Indonesia, he faced immense difficulties as he was unfamiliar with the country and did not speak the language. The 30 Sep 1965 purging of the Communists, where tens of thousands of Indonesian Communists were killed by the Indonesian military, made his situation increasingly unbearable.

To exacerbate matters, Cultural Revolution erupted in China and Chiam was criticized for his previous actions. He was criticized for his wrongdoings, forced to apologized and ostracized from the party. But he was said to be steadfast and hung on to his beliefs, never betrayed his comrades even though he was exiled from the party and lead a precarious life.

The only consolation Chiam had was in the mid-1990s when CPM leader Chin Peng met Chiam in a Guangzhou hotel. Chin reverted previous criticisms of Chiam and reaffirmed Chiam's lifetime commitment to the Communist cause.

Chiam passed away on Apr 26, 1998, due to multiple illnesses. He was 68 years old.

38 Years on: Goh Lay Kuan The Red Ballerina

Browsing the Straits Times forum section yesterday, I was surprised to see a letter talking about Goh Lay Kuan and her arrest under the ISA in 1976, written by Lionel De Souza. Mr De Souza, a former policeman, is apparently someone close to the establishment; and one does wonder why the sudden need to bring up the fact that Goh, who is also wife of Kuo Pao Kun, joined a splinter group of the CPM and visited a communist training camp in 1975. 

 

 

It was only with careful reading of the recent ST interview of Goh Lay Kuan that one can conjecture the deeper meaning behind the letter. In that interview with Goh dated 3 May 2014, she said ISD was looking to detain those who had received communist military training and she was lucky that she didn't know how to draw a gun.

 

 

 

 

This was despite the fact that she had met a high ranking communist cadre named Sister Fong and together they made a trip to a communist guerrilla military camp in the Malaysia-Thailand border where Goh received instructions from Fong to recruit more members and raise funds.

Goh made another interesting claim during the recent ST interview. She said she "overturned" tables when she was being interviewed by ISD officers. I am not sure whether Goh meant it in the literal sense of the word, or was it figurative?

Nevertheless, after this supposedly valiant act, she submissively went on national TV to "confess" her role in the communist plot and also pinpoint others who were involved. It must be day and night to go from overturning tables to appearing meekly on TV; but alas only those who were there would really know the truth.

Moving to the larger picture, Goh was one of the 50 people arrested in that operation. These 50 were charged with being affiliated to a group trying to rekindle the cause of communist subversion and terrorism. The group was the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), a violent splinter group of the Communist Party of Malaya. Items seized from this group include, field directives, photographs of communist guerillas training in Malaysia-Thailand border, cash, booby-trap paraphernalia, including detonators and sketches of military installations.

Earlier in June 1974, another ISD operation nabbed 31 members of the same group, MNLF, and seized one pistol, 42 bullets, one hand grenade, 16 detonators, 3 homemade bombs and 5 improvised detonators.

Historically speaking, there was no definitive answer to say Goh was guilty or not, because the group was arrested before they could carry out any real attacks. But, it would be injustice to history if a reader reads the ST interview at face value, without understanding the facts behind the event.

The genealogy of criticism against National Service

It gets picked up so regularly among the men during class gatherings and the festive seasons' idle chat that many would not think National Service could be such a heated and sensitive issue. It seems almost given that National Service is an institution in today's Singapore. Many a times, it has been quoted as an example where Singaporeans across all races and social classes bond together in a common cause; despite the many criticisms that Malays are excluded from certain military vocations due to geopolitical considerations.

Nevertheless, NS does have its fair share of criticism and in the recent years the most common complain is not against the fundamentals of NS, but rather how it has hindered individuals in our increasingly competitive economy where time away from improving one's career is only accentuated by the foreign workforce who do not have such obligations. 

Today, we mostly criticise the form in which NS should take. But how Singapore has moved away from questioning the very basis of why we perform NS, to protesting the form in which it takes place is a reflection of how we have grown as a nation.

It was not so long ago that Singaporeans actually denied the idea of doing NS. The first of these were actually on 13 May 1954 where students of Chinese middle schools who were protesting against conscription by the British colonial power, clashed against riot police resulting in 26 injured. For many historians, the National Service Riots of 1954 marked the beginning of communist subversion in the Chinese middle schools, which subsequently became the breeding ground for communist sympathisers in Singapore.

In fact, just a couple of days ago, these same pioneers celebrated the 60th Anniversary of this event with a lunch, singing of old battle songs and solace in common memories of a past struggle. The event was well attended with a crowd of about 700 including members of the opposition political parties, mainly NSP and SDP.

Photo source: https://www.facebook.com/hochoonhiong/media_set?set=a.10152393531047453.1073741948.699302452&type=1

In analysis, protests broke out in 1954 because the colonial government expected full compliance from the students of the Chinese middle schools, who at the same time were excluded from many economic opportunities that were available to those who were English educated. 

"The National Service Ordinance ruling angered the Chinese middle school students because they were compelled to defend the same British order that had discriminated against them and in which they saw no future in. Many Chinese who felt that they were not being treated as equals by the British also did not feel obliged to serve the colonial government."

So, despite the fact that the idea had public support, and registration for national service went smoothly with 98% of eligible students having registered themselves, the tide slowly turned against the Brits and culminated in the National Service Riots of 1954.

Due to the strong opposition, the colonial government had no choice but to postpone the implementation of the National Service Ordinance. Thereafter, it was said that this episode awakened the Chinese students' political consciousness and strengthened the influence of student leaders and they subsequently formed the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Union (SCMSSU) - which became a pro-communist organisation that was sometimes radical and violent.

Looking at the anniversary event held 3 days ago, it was interesting to note that the event was organised by F8, which is an organisation formed by the Marxists detainees of 1987.

And, it was not surprising to see that the the detainees of 1987, especially Vincent Cheng, produced various publications in the 1980s, such as the Singapore Highlights to question the need of National Service and a high defence budget. In one article, it asked "Why do we teach the young minds to hate and kill?"

Another publication produced by the so-called Marxist conspirators was the Commscord, which was a newsletter aimed at NS men, giving them a hostile view of the military life and using Marxist arguments to convince readers that NS was setup to further the evils of a capitalistic society. 

Looking back, while NS has become less controversial today, it can still be a touchy subject, because ultimately NS is a liability whether in 1954, 1987 or 2014; and no matter how much the state compensates the individual, the golden years of one's youth can never be recaptured, except through a common consensus that we do so for the survival of this little red dot. 

Thum PJ: "Public anger" caused the 1956 riots

It is with some interest that I read the latest assertions by historian Thum PJ on how Lim Chin Siong was wrongfully arrested for inciting a riot in 1956.

According to Thum, he had discovered an archival record which contained the transcript of Lim Chin Siong's speech during the night of the riot and that in this record, Lim Chin Siong did not ask the people to “pah mata” (beat up the police) but wanted the police to join him and his cause. Thum proceeds to assert that the subsequent arrest of Lim is wrong and thus, fits into his persistent historical assessment that Lim was not a communist - although Lim had joined the outlawed communist Anti-British League and rose to prominence in several communist trade unions.

If it was not Lim's fault, than whose fault was it? Why was the crowd so worked up that day and not any other day? Having absolved Lim from all responsibility, Thum's historical investigation is reduced simply to the claim that “public anger was too strong” and therefore the riots occurred.

So the elephant in the room was, why was public anger so strong on that day, as claimed? This, Thum did not bother to find out.

A dusty piece of paper from the colonial archives cannot convey the emotions of a fiery night when words spoken from the podium carry a lot of underlying meanings. One cannot even know the tone that was used. It could be “mai pah mata...” or it could very well be “mai...PAH MATA!”

Only those present at that historical moment can understand what Lim spoke ahout and what he wanted the people to do. If I were to read this historical document now, I would also wonder why I was so angry then. UNLESS you read through the entire document, you will find how words were played with sparks and could possibly set off fire.

And I quote Lim Chin Siong:

“(let's) quickly unite together for tonight there is a possibility that something big will happen. But, dear brothers and sisters, if any of our sons are assaulted we will not tolerate it.”

“We must also use method to get rid of this oppressive Government and to attain our final objective..We must take certain action to retaliate against their oppressive action.”

“Mayday is the workers' struggle for better living and to commemorate past events of bloodshed (believed to be referring to Hock Lee Bus riot). Workers must zealously celebrate and be united to fight to the end.”

As a historian, Thum is entitled to make his assessment. But even my lecturer constantly drilled me to question sources and not make simplistic prima facie assessments from one single historical source.

For example, CPM chief Chin Peng said in his memoirs that left-wing trade unions in Singapore were receiving instructions from the communists. The Plen, Fong Chong Pik, in his memoirs, said that he had a “special acquaintance” with Lim and had met him 3 times. In fact, it was the British Security Council assessment that also pinned Lim as a communist...so Chin Peng, The Plen and the Brits were all lying about the same thing?! So there were no communists, no riots, no bombings? Or all these just random acts of “public anger” also?

Now, for Thum to put the blame of the riot on “public anger” is perhaps somewhat disrespectful to those who there on that night.

Cuz Lim Chin Siong would never lay the blame on the people.

Revising the Revisionists: Operation Coldstore in History

The battle of the minds on Singapore's early Independence history is heating up. After Dr. Thum Ping Tjin's recent assertion that Operation Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise by the PAP to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition in Singapore, another academic Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna has come out questioning Thum's position and research on the issue. This crossing of swords between Singapore's intelligentsia is exciting to say the least and will help in the recovery of Singapore's historical amnesia. 

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The recent controversy over the Indonesian navy’s decision to name a vessel after two marines that had bombed MacDonald House in Singapore on 10 March 1965 is revealing. It has reinforced philosopher George Santayana’s quip that those who cannot remember the past will be condemned to repeat it. The action by the two bombers, Osman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said, killed three Singaporeans and injured 33 others, and was part of the low-intensity war known to posterity as Confrontation. 

This campaign was waged by the left-leaning Indonesian President Sukarno against what he regarded as a British ‘neo-colonial’ challenge to his designs for regional supremacy: the newly inaugurated Federation of Malaysia, which at the time included Singapore. Particularly telling was how much effort the media and several ministers had to invest to enlighten Singaporeans as to why the Indonesian decision was injurious to Singapore’s national dignity. Such collective historical amnesia is not exactly healthy as it renders the body politic vulnerable to distorted versions of defining episodes in our history.

Case in point is another historical episode from the tumultuous 1960s that has received rather sensationalistic treatment recently: the internal security action called Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963, two years before the MacDonald House bombing. History records that Coldstore was mounted to contain the threat to Singapore’s security posed by the Communist United Front then dominating key interest groups. 

Now Ping Tjin Thum (P.J. Thum), a young Singaporean historian, disputes this. He argues instead that Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition that had hitherto offered the only credible electoral challenge to Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP).

This is a good story. But reality was not that straightforward. 

The Context

By the late 1950s, in the midst of the Cold War and post-war decolonization, the British Colonial Office sought to transfer power to local governments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore that would be anti-Communist and friendly to Western geostrategic interests. British Commonwealth forces were meanwhile engaged in a shooting war with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in the jungles of that country. 

South of the Causeway a strong Communist United Front (CUF) had penetrated the Chinese-educated workers’ and students’ associations, as well as the left-wing political party, the PAP, that seemed most likely to win the election for limited self-government in 1959. The British feared that the CUF would ultimately overwhelm the English-educated PAP leadership led by Lee, turning Singapore into a Communist-dominated ‘second Cuba’ in the heart of maritime Southeast Asia.

The Colonial Office in London and Lee hence sought to persuade the politically conservative Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to overcome his fear of upsetting Malay political dominance and power in Malaya with the absorption of Singapore Chinese. To resolve the racial equation, they proposed that the island be absorbed into an expanded Malay Federation that would include the British Borneo territories as well.  The geopolitical calculus was that with control of Singapore’s internal security vested in a staunchly anti-Communist central government in Kuala Lumpur the CPM would be severely curtailed. 

Hence Singapore would develop within the Federation framework in the desired pro-Western, anti-Communist direction.  Because Tunku insisted that Merger with Singapore required its Communists to be first brought to heel, Coldstore was mounted in February 1963. Eight months later, in September, Singapore achieved full independence from the United Kingdom as part of the Federation of Malaysia.

Thum’s Perspective

Thum now appears to question this standard security-driven narrative of Coldstore. His ‘revisionist’ interpretation focuses on PAP leader Lee’s supposed obsession with power and determination to destroy his closest political rival, the charismatic Chinese-speaking ‘progressive leftist’ Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues in the PAP, the unions and other interest associations. 

By late 1962 the supremely crafty Lee had apparently manipulated the British and Tunku into a corner.  In particular, Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore, expressed misgivings that the list of individuals that Lee wanted detained seemed to be targeted simply for being in political opposition.  

Lim Chin Siong especially seemed to be fingered not because of security reasons but because Lee wanted him arrested so that the PAP would win the upcoming general elections. Because the political clock was ticking away, Tunku warned the British in January 1963 that if the Chinese-educated political left in Singapore were not locked away, Merger would be off. An anxious Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys in London thus overruled the objections of Selkirk and Coldstore went ahead.  Politics had trumped security.

Reality Check

There are two main problems with Thum’s argument. First, he argues – citing Selkirk’s contemporaneous concerns - that at the time of Coldstore there was no direct evidence that Lim Chin Siong and other detainees were engaged in actual Communist subversion.  But the records do show that even careful British officials conceded that Lim was a skilful CUF operative and other detainees possessed a recent history of subversive activities. 

Tunku also agreed that the detentions on preventive grounds were necessary. This was prudent. CPM elements within the utterly penetrated Barisan Socialis that was challenging the PAP for power never ruled out switching strategy to armed violence at any time. Historian T.N. Harper hence considers Selkirk’s attempted distinction between ‘political’ and ‘security’ grounds for detention as ‘problematic’. 

Second, Thum emphasizes how Tunku and Selkirk disliked Lee’s personality and byzantine political machinations. But CUF leaders – said to possess ‘animal cunning’ themselves – in fact regarded the tactically agile Lee as the only serious obstacle to their plans to establish Communist rule in Singapore. British envoy in Kuala Lumpur Geofroy Tory sympathized with Lee’s position, warning that playing by ‘Queensbury rules’ with the unscrupulous Communists would be folly.  

Ultimately, cautious British officials in Singapore conceded that in view of what historian S. J. Ball called the ‘ruthless, fast-moving and mendacious’ nature of local politics at the time, Lee Kuan Yew, warts and all, was ‘the only man who can run this city’.

Revising Revisionism

Singapore celebrates its 50th national birthday next year and the nation seems to be in ‘mid-life crisis’, grappling with issues like immigration, national identity and political change. In this light, the appearance of revisionist historical accounts – aided and abetted by the historical amnesia Santayana warned about - is unsurprising.  Nevertheless, perhaps one positive step to begin salving the national mood is more extensive, innovative and creative public education efforts to promote a greater appreciation for and knowledge of our history. 

As part of this process, Operation Coldstore itself must be seen in context – it occurred during a difficult episode in our history amidst a genuinely dangerous period in the Cold War, as evidenced by the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, ongoing advances made by communists in Indochina, the Brunei revolt in December 1962, and of course the Indonesian Konfrontasi from January 1963.  

The revisionist view that Coldstore was utterly driven by Lee’s obsession with political power is hence misleading. A more nuanced analysis suggests that reality at the time was defined by morally complex shades of grey.  Ultimately, following Machiavelli, the moral test of tough policy choices must be whether they benefit a nation in the long run. Fifty-one years on, even critics concede that Singapore has blossomed into a cosmopolitan, politically stable and economically vibrant metropolis. History would therefore - on balance – very likely adjudge that Coldstore passed this test.

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Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Nanyang Technological University. A historian by background, he has published extensively on the struggle against post-war Malayan Communism. He is working on a longer scholarly analysis of Operation Coldstore.