From London with Love

Dear Editor,

This is my letter:

Two perhaps questionable moves by Tan Jee Say in his early efforts to gather public support for his next run for office -- one is to rely on the widely circulated but maybe questionable research findings of a relatively new professor (Thum Ping Tjin). The other is to parrot what this fresh researcher wrote and said without due diligence of his own, like cross-checking with other historians and sources.

Having recently retired and now splitting my free time between Singapore and London, researching into the social history of Singapore, let me cite just 4 reasons why both Tan and Thum might not get a reply the government:

Firstly, unknown to many non-historians and members of the public, Thum has given a simplistic account of the communist threat and Operation Coldstore in his talks and articles. Thum has ignored several colonial dispatches and Internal Security Council (ISC) minutes that clearly showed the existence of a serious communist threat. Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore and his deputy, Philip Moore, were concerned about the communist threat and had advocated firm action as early as 1960. See for example these extracts from the British archives:

In a May 1960 ISC meeting, Lord Selkirk:

“…expressed his appreciation of the skilful way in which the Singapore Government were trying to deal with the problem of subversion in the trade unions, but said that it was obviously necessary to keep a careful watch on any pressure building up to subvert the TUC [Trade Union Congress].” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 9th Meeting, 19 May 1960 (para 4) (See JPEG Selkirk1)

Later, during another ISC meeting in October 1960, Selkirk commented that the Singapore Government:

“…was faced here by a challenge against the democratic system over the whole of Malaya. To a large extent this challenge was now being made through the trade unions in Singapore. The Government could not allow itself to be knocked about by the Communists acting through the trade unions. The strength of the Government's case was that these people were pressing the Communist cause by subversive methods. By sticking to its line, the Government would emerge stronger in the end. It should not, therefore, be deterred by fears of any temporary unpopularity.” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 14th Meeting, 7 Oct 1960 (para 8) (See JPEG Selkirk2)

Second, whatever reservations Selkirk or his deputy Philip Moore might have had about arresting the communists, they later became fully convinced of the need for security action when more evidence emerged about communist control of the political party Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), the discussion BSS leaders had about the question of armed struggle, and when the BSS came out in support of the armed rebellion in Brunei. On 7 December 1962, a day before the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, Moore wrote:

“I enclose copies of reports which came to us last month from a reliable and well placed source on two meetings held at the headquarters of the Barisan Sosialis last September. These reports are of considerable importance, not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist controlled…It has never been disputed that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front…The report on the first of the two meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends. Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”. CO 1030/1160, Moore to Wallace, 7 Dec 1962 (paras 1 and 2) (See JPEG Selkirk3)

A week later, on 14 December 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

“I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this. Accordingly H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] were prepared to see [arrest] action taken in Singapore…”. CO 1030/1160, Selkirk to SSC, Tel. 582, 14 Dec 1962 (para 5) (See JPEG Selkirk4)

Third, the above British declassified documents show that it is a big folly to read the MI5 report in isolation. Thum Ping Tjin and then Tan Jee Say have brandished the MI5 report without realizing that it should be read in the context of active and robust discussions about the extent of the communist threat. Thum is seized by the MI5 report without considering its context and taking into consideration the totality of evidence. I do hope that Tan Jee Say will reconsider his position, because as a opposition politician and he shouldn't bet so many eggs in this basket. 

Fourth, what Thum (and Tan) fail to realize is that the MI5 report by the British SLO Maurice Williams was not the norm, and it is a gross error of judgment for a historian, even if new, to rely heavily on such a report to make momentous conclusions. Revelations from many sources, including CPM sources, confirmed without a shadow of a doubt, the existence of a communist conspiracy and the communist united front. CPM chief Chin Peng and the Plen had revealed in their books about sabotaging PAP’s plans for merger and Malaysia. The Plen had revealed how he had used the Chinese press to disseminate his opposing views. He also revealed how he had had secret meetings in Jakarta to lead the united front in Singapore and target the PAP for subversion, how he had ordered a top CPM cadre in the Workers Party to resign, and how he had ordered all support for Partai Rakyat to be withdrawn during the 1959 General Election. Chin Peng in turn had disclosed how Deng Xiaoping had ‘advised’ him in July 1961 in Beijing to continue with the armed struggle and how he accepted the ‘advice’ and Deng’s offer of financial help. These are just some facts that clearly contradict the claims by Thum, Tan and others that there was “no evidence” of a communist conspiracy.

Bottomline for all interested readers is this -- we should read new interpretations of history with a curious mind and not take everything at face value. As a Singaporean who has been a long time working resident of London, I will say that the British public is also somewhat skeptical of the British archives because one might never know if ALL documents were declassified or if officials writing the reports have other motivations. Nevertheless, Singaporeans should never forget our own history because if we do, then Singapore would really become just a place for people to make money!

Abdul Salim Rahim

Lim Chin Siong was never a communist...?

As much as LKY wanted him to be a communist, he could never prove LCS as one, conclusively. Even if he was one, he would never publicly admit to be a member of the Communist Party of Malaya as that would land him in jail. The CPM was an outlawed organisation.

Similarly, a gangster would never admit to be a member of a secret society. And because criminal cases against prominent gangsters are so hard to clinch, we often find that these people are held in detention without trial under the CLTP, or what is commonly known as "Section 55" - albeit less controversially as compared to the ISA although technically they are similar.

The Plen, Chin Peng, etc, were clearly communists because they were the top leadership of the hierarchy and they eventually joined the armed struggle in Peace Villages in Southern Thailand. However, other communists who were tasked to work in the Communist United Front weren't so upfront with their allegiances as it was precisely their job to appear leftist, socialist, communalist; anything but communist, in order to continue to manage political affairs from behind the scenes.

How is it possible then for someone to say such and such person is highly likely a communist?

In this entry, we would look at the instances whereby LCS' deeds and association indicated that he could be a communist. While the information was sourced from Albert Lau's article titled "The Battle for Merger-The Historical Context", the original information was actually from various sources such as academic writings, memoirs and other periodicals.

If we read the body of evidence in its entirety, we will find that LCS' links with the communists cannot be simple.

Meeting with The Plen (CPM Singapre Chief) on various occassions

"Within days of the Malayan leader's speech (Tunku AR's speech on formation of Malaysia), Lim Chin Siong conferred with Fang Chuang Pi, one of the communists' top three leaders overseeing Singapore..."[Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse, p227]

"On 16 July (1961), a day after PAP lost Anson (to Workers' Party), Fang Chuang Pi again conferred secretly with Lim Chin Siong. Two days later, an urgent approach was made to see Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner, who invited the pro-communist group, which included Lim and three others, for tea the same day." [Sonny Yap, Richard Lim, and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story of Singapore's Ruling Political Party, pp ix and 323] 

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A member of the Anti-British League which was communist controlled

"Lim did admit to being a member of the underground Anti-British League (ABL) even though he insisted that "being in the ABL does not mean you are communist"...the ABL was...a dedicated clandestine arm of the CPM set up in September 1948 (after the Emergency was declared) for the purpose of overthrowing the British colonial government...the main duties of ABL members were to "learn revolutionary" and "undergo various clandestine activities such as recruiting new members, distributing flyers and putting up slogans"..They also purchased medicine and supplies to support the CPM's armed struggle."[Melanie Chiew, Leaders of Singapore, p118, Zhong Hua, "A Preliminary Study on the history of Singapore People's Anti-British League and Zhou Guang, 'First Anti-British League group in Singapore Chinese High School in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement; The Legendary Figures of the Singapore People's Anti-British League ]

"According to Bloodworth, Lim had reportedly initiated a Chinese High School student activist, Seet Chay Tuan, into the ABL. Seet "remembered the night the previous year he was summoned to a secret rendezvous...and stood obediently in front of a picture of Stalin pinned to a wooden post, his fist raised, while Chin Siong read out a declaration of allegiance which he was then to swear and sign with his new Party name and so become a full member of the 'Organisation'."" [Bloodworth, p69]

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Oral History of Devan Nair

"Nair recalled how Samad Ismail, a CPM member since 1949, had introduced him to Lim and that "Chin Siong was getting his guidance then from South Johor. Nair, who used to spend his evenings and nights at Lim's Middle Road union headquarters, remembered occasions when "somebody from the underground who is not know to the police" arriving to pass Lim a note. "And Chin Siong would read it and straight away burn it." [Devan Nair, Transcript of Oral History Interview]

Essay of CPM member Zhang Taiyong

"In his essay in the 2013 book, Zhang disclosed that the CPM had transferred Lim from underground activities in the ABL to open front work. After Lim's explusion from the Chinese High School for his role in an examination boycott, he "continued his studies at an English-stream school but later accepted the organisation's decision and devoted himself to trade union movement and constitutional struggle." [Zhang Taiyong, "Our cohort's commander - Lu Yexun" in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement, p61] 

Retired Malaysian Special Branch officer Aloysius Chin

"the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police who held a long-standing watch over the communists in Malaya, also divulged that CPM leaders Siu Cheong and Ah Hoi cited Lim as an example of CPM members who were deployed in open front activities in political parties" [Aloysius Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya, The Inside Story, p67]

Documents in LCS' handwriting

"Two documents in Lim's own handwriting were among several he wrote for CPM records and for the instruction of recruits to the CPM who were under his leadership. One of them was on the talk he gave in the commemoration of Stalin's death. Another contained guidance notes for his ABL subordinates on the CPM's secret journal STUDY." 

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LKY's challenge to LCS after accusing him of being a communist

"Lim Chin Siong issued a signed statement accusing the prime minister of "sensationalism". To Lim's retort that he was "sick and tired" of having to deny association with communists, Lee Kuan Yew gave this risposte at a press conference on 27 January 1962: "If the documents were not written by him, he should deny it, sue me and the Government printers for libel and forgery." Lim never did. 

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And former Director of Internal Security Branch, Yoong Siew Wah, when writing on his own blog noted the following:

"It was a well-known fact that Lim Chin Siong, the former general secretary of the powerful Singapore Factory & Shop Workers Union was the undisputed leader of the communist united front and controlled the mass base. Lee Kuan Yew could not have been unaware of this fact and knew that he had to depend on Lim Chin Siong and his mass base to advance his political ambition."

So while there are mentions in British archives to suggest that LCS was not a communist, it should be noted that those who say otherwise are aplenty.  

Govt fears amnesia as Battle for Merger goes for reprint

As the government machinery goes up a gear to promote the latest launch of Battle for Merger, maybe we should slow down and think why we have come to this juncture where the government frets that Singaporeans will one day forget our roots, and how historical debates are only the concern of a very very small group interested persons.

Yes, materialism is one main reason because of how our small island state has been tuned to survive through economic relevance in the global markets. Another reason is really because the education system has been giving local history a stale treatment, explaining how each stage of  historical socio-economic development was lacking until PAP came along. I am sure all A level history students can attest how histories of China, India and modern Europe was much more interesting than local history.

The last reason, which could be also the most damning, is that Singaporeans simply can't be bothered to learn their own history, and easily accepts what is presented to them. PAP supporters would want to believe that the communist threat was so violent that it was only through Lee's grace that extermination of the communists was not carried out. Conversely, many in the opposition chuckle at the "communist conspiracy" and take the view LKY was merely using the ISA to jail the opposition. If only historical truth was this simple duality...

The Battle for Merger was actually a series of 12 radio talks given by Mr LKY in 1961 in English, Malay and Mandarin. He argued that the Malayan Communist Party had used violence and sought to prevent the merger of Singapore with Malaya.

But if one is interested, especially those who read noveau interpretations of history and get all excited, they would find that the series of 12 radio talk that spoke on the dangers of the Communist Party of Malaya and the Communist United Front, were in fact all along available for listeners from the national archives websites, at no charge. They only needed your time and attention

But why should anyone read what this man has to say? Well, if one desires to get as close as possible to a historical truth, one should read and analyse from a variety of sources and not just depend on British, American or Communist sources to tell a version of events. Although I am quite sure some are just quite dismissive of Mr LKY because of what they went through under him rather than what they read of him. But surely it is important to read what he has to say if you want to understand the historical circumstances of Singapore, because LKY was one of the main actor.

And the main reason why you should read (but you may not agree) is the fact that after all has been said and done, an large majority of Singaporeans, at that time (in 59, 63 and 68) voted PAP/LKY into power, believed in their ideology and trusted the PAP with their livelihoods. You may argue that LKY won because he removed the opposition, but the same could be argued that if the support for opposition was so strong, they would have spoiled the votes, revolted and protested in the streets...but they did not. It passed its test of legitimacy although not with flying colours, some might argue.

A compelling point to remember when reading this book is - to argue his points, LKY, (in 1961, still not all-powerful as he would be in 1965), was very open about his personal encounters with British officials, the UMNO politicians, the Communists, the Leftists and even his own colleagues - and to date, there has been no noteworthy contestations to the version of events as he presented it.

For example, in The Battle for Merger, LKY shared a thereafter oft-quoted story where he met the PLEN, otherwise known as Fong Chong Pik, a powerful representative of the Communist Party of Malaya, in 1958. The PLEN was proposing that the PAP work together the CPM to form an anti-colonial united front. LKY was hesitant as the communists then were lending their support to David Marshall's Workers' Party. To verify that the PLEN was as powerful as he claimed, LKY asked the PLEN to prove his good faith by asking pro-Communist trade unionist Chang Yuen Tong to resign from the WP and City Council, so that David Marshall and WP can go on their own without communist support. Several weeks later, Chang Yuen Tong did just that. The PLEN had proven his credentials. And WP failed miserably in the 1959 elections.

Now, you might ask, how does that square with the latest assertions that trade unionists and politicians arrested during 1963 were not communists but merely leftists? Was Chang a lone wolf or just one of the many communist-inspired pawns that CPM could move? If so, who were those keeping their allegiances and associations secret?   

Another example, in 1959, after LKY secured the release of Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, Fong Swee Suan, Sidney Woodhull, James Puthucheary and Chan Chiaw Thor, (who were detained by the Labour Front and Brits for suspected communist activities), all except for Lim told to LKY that they not again let CPM make use of the PAP. They declared that if the CPM fought the PAP because of this, they would fight with the PAP against the CPM. To this end, they signed a declaration renouncing communism.    

So, if the assertion is that Lim Chin Siong was not communist, why did he not make the same gentleman's agreement like the rest of the above stated leftists? Another historical riddle rings up the register...

In conclusion, as we reaped what they have sown, as those who went before us slowly wither, as our genesis sometimes seemed more like a bad dream, I think it is ever so important for those who care about Singapore's history to pick up this book and read about the people, deeds and events of that era before coming to a conclusion. 

   

1956 Labour Govt White Paper on Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students' Union

I came across an interesting Labour Front government White Paper dated 1956 on the issue of the Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union (SCMSSU).

In brief, the SCMSSU (October 1955 – September 1956) was a mass student organisation for Chinese Middle School Students that participated in leftist and anti-colonial struggle against the unfair treatment of Chinese education. It was banned by the Labour Front government on 24 September 1956 over charges that it was a communist front organisation. Leftists and revisionist historians have challenged the government’s accusations of CPM subversion and claimed that the SCMSSU did not engage in political struggle. However, such revisionist accounts do not square entirely with documentary evidence.

The following is a commentary about the SCMSSU based on the White Paper and other sources. The original White Paper can be accessed here.

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In 1954, a delegation of over-aged Chinese Middle School students stood up to oppose the colonial government’s attempt to enforce conscription in Singapore. The students’ opposition to National Service culminated in riots when student demonstrators clashed with police on 13 May 1954 resulting in many injuries. This clash was followed by two years of student-led political action against the government. This same delegation of students eventually formed the SCMSSU with fiery student leader Soon Loh Boon as its president.

Even at this early stage, some of the leaders of this delegation may have been CPM members or subsequently became targets of cultivation for the CPM.

The following is a quote from a CPM directive dated 11 June 1956 (See White Paper, p.1):

“The work of winning over the school children is very important and must not be overlooked. Especially in circumstances where the enemy is stronger than we are, the work of winning support from school children and organising them to struggle is more important than military activities.”

According to historian CC Chin, in 1954, it was the CPM Students’ Committee leaders Huang Mingqiang and Chiam Chong Chian who put together a seven-member “National Service Task Force” to lead the student protests against conscription. This is supported by a statement made in 1955 by a Chinese Middle school student who was an SCMSSU leader and an undercover CPM agent (See White Paper, p.1):

“At one stage the Government was about to permit registration (of the Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union) under the conditions that students should not take part in political activities or interfere with labour disputes. Representatives of the Preparatory Committee refused to accept this proviso and this was considered by the Party Organisation to be stupid … The Union should accept such conditions outwardly but carry on with political activities afterwards … The decision to register the Union with the proviso was undoubtedly made by the Party Organisation and accepted by the S.C.M.S.S.U.”

For more Chiam Chong Chian, read the earlier posts talking about his early life and how he organised the Anti-National Service Riots.

After its formal registration on 6 October 1955, the SCMSSU became involved in more anti-colonial activities with leftist organisations such as the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers’ Union led by pro-communist Lim Chin Siong, and the Singapore Women’s Federation led by CPM member Chen Mong Hock. Their struggles prompted the government to ban the SCMSSU on 24 September 1956, causing even more anger among the Chinese Middle School students.

In this context, the government issued the 1956 White Paper to justify the dissolution of the SCMSSU for being a “Communist Front Organisation”.

In his recent book “My Youth in Black and White” published in 2014, pro-communist leader and former ISA-detainee Lim Chin Joo (brother of Lim Chin Siong) dismisses communist involvement in the SCMSSU and argued that the CPM was not the leader or instigator of leftist student movements. He further claimed there was no conclusive proof that the SCMSSU was engaged in any leftist political activity.

Although the White Paper suffers from anti-communist bias, the facts of the White Paper clearly demonstrate that the SCMSSU was a prominent pro-CPM participant in the leftist and anti-colonial politics of that time.

According to the White Paper, although the government had registered the SCMSSU on condition that the students abstain from politics, the SCMSSU still managed to involve itself in leftist rallies, labour disputes and propaganda work to defend against any perceived threats to Chinese education, Chinese students and workers rights.

The White Paper also singled out the SCMSSU’s “Hsueh-Hsih” (Study) campaign as evidence of CPM influence. According to the White Paper, the term “Hsueh-Hsih” is derived from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) slogan, which approximately means “Study for Action”. However, it is not clear whether the SCMSSU’s definition of “Hsueh-Hsih” was truly communist in nature. At the time, there were conflicting interpretations of the term even within the SCMSSU itself.

Regardless, the methods of the Hsueh-Hsih campaign as stated in the White Paper did offer the CPM an avenue to discreetly influence the students. By organising picnics, meetings and study groups outside of their parents’ and teachers’ supervision, the CPM could isolate the students’ from sources of reactionary influence. Interestingly, the White Paper stated that the SCMSSU had even adopted “Criticism and Self-Criticism” exercises to foster solidarity amongst the students. In these exercises, students would undergo a round of public criticism in front of their peers for errors in their ideology and personality. The White Paper claimed that such “criticism” exercises can trace their origins to the CCP’s indoctrination tactics and was allegedly used by the SCMSSU to pressure political opponents.

In its closing paragraphs, the White Paper also declared that the government had detained “several student members who have had Communist connections, one of them a Union official who produced copies of M.C.P. [Malayan Communist Party] secret and illegal publications on subversion”.

One of the arrested SCMSSU officials handed over documents explaining the CPM view that Hsueh Hsih “helps comrades to gather sufficient strength to meet the high tide of revolution” and defined Criticism and Self-Criticism as “the propelling power of the revolution”. There were also instructions to apply the lessons of the CCP’s victory in China to the “National Liberation movement in colonies and semi-colonies” (including Malaya). One of the arrested students was eventually convicted and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for possessing these CPM materials (See White Paper, p.18).

All this lends credence to academics who have long acknowledged that the CPM had established an extensive network of communist and leftist sympathisers among the Chinese Middle School students.

Nevertheless, not all leftist student leaders were acting for the CPM. Indeed, CPM operations were aided by the growing anti-colonial sentiments of many Chinese school students. Had the communists been more patient and harvested the enthusiastic student and labour movement for a showdown at the ballot box, the history of Singapore would have been different. But what happened between the years 1954 and 1956 was that societal unrest, in part instigated by communists, gave the colonial authorities reasons to target what they saw as CPM front organisations and detain any CPM leaders involved. Such was the fate of the SCMSSU.

What did the Communists say about Operation Coldstore?

So it seems even former Permanent Secretaries, the highest of life form in the public service if you don't want to wear white on white, can't help but to wade into the historical debate. Over the weekend I saw this:

In case you didn't know who's Bilahari, he is none other than retired Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bilahari Kausikan, who by the way gave one a kick-ass speech to the privileged boys at RI. But you wonder why was he talking about a TOC article that was already much talked about in Dec 2013? Maybe he missed out on the party back in Dec?  

Of course the former Permanent Secretary was not alone, and he was quickly rebutted by the rising star of local revisionist historian, Thum PJ:

Anyway, I have earlier written what I think about the current revisionist history here. Maybe both sides are trying too hard to prove the other wrong? One uses (extensively) records from the British Colonial offices and the other quotes history books written by what some may call sanctioned historians. Maybe one should get creative when official records are still held closely by the tightfisted Ministry of Home Affairs...

So what did the communists themselves have to say about Operation Coldstore and the Communist United Front? Has anyone researched the memoirs of former Communists operatives? For example, Chiam Chong Chian, a CPM cadre who was said to orchestrated the May 1954 Anti-National Service riot.

This is what Chin Peng, the former leader of Communist Party of Malaya wrote about Operation Coldstore and Communist United Front:

- Referring to the "numbers of people we controlled" in Singapore in 1959, Chin Peng wrote, "I can certainly say that most of the island's workers sympathized with the left-wing trade unions and members of these unions were well appreciated they were under the control of the CPM. (p.409).

- On plans to sabotage merger, Chin Peng, Siao Chang and Eu Chooi Yip had a discussion in Beijing in mid-1961. Chin Peng wrote: "Our Peking meeting also examined in the detail the Malaysia Plan that was being hatched between London and Kuala Lumpur. The three of us came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interest of our Party if we plotted to sabotage this. If we couldn't derail it, at least we might substantially delay its implementation." (p. 437) (This is in line with what the Plen and Lim Chin Siong did in Singapore to frustrate merger?)

- On Operation Coldstore, Chin Peng wrote that it "shattered our underground network throughout the island. Those who escaped the police net went into hiding. Many fled to Indonesia." (p.439) (The clearest admission by CPM that those arrested were CPM or CUF members?)

The leader of Communist Party of Malaya in Singapore, Fong Chong Pik, better known as The Plen, also wrote about Singapore's security situation from the mid 50s to 60s:

- The Plen wrote that at a secret meeting with other CPM leaders in Jakarta in 1957 (after the the 1954-1956 strikes, demonstrations and riots): "We were informed that the Central Committee took a positive view of the widespread development of the open mass movement in Singapore and sent its praises." (p.124) (That is, CPM approve of what their front men had been instigating in Singapore in the mid-50s.)

- The Plen wrote that the CPM "central leadership had decided to establish a working group...to directly and completely lead the struggle in Singapore" and that "both he [Eu Chooi Yip] and I had been appointed to the working group". (p. 122) (This reiterates CPM role behind the scenes in Singapore.)

- The Plan frankly revealed that he had used the Chinese press to delay merger. He wrote: "A lot of opinions expressed in the newspapers originated from me. These included slowing down the process of merger, and adopting the form of confederation." (p.161) (Wonder if revisionist historians can spot The Plen writing in the newspapers?)

- On his relationship with Lim Chin Siong, who was said to the CPM open front leader, the Plen wrote cryptically, "LIm Chin Siong and I did have a "definitely not normal association" and that Lim was a person "with whom I have had a special acquaintance." (pp. 170, 176-177)

  

All this debate and research is a good sign for the understanding of Singapore's history, especially the period of 50s and 60s where there has been a lack of neutral scholarly work. While some say that there was no communist conspiracy in Singapore's pre-independence political landscape, the memoirs of several communists leaders and operatives had indicated that they were active in the fight for independence of Singapore and against the LKY's idea of merger with Malaysia.

Maybe next year when Singapore celebrates our 50th birthday, the government would decide to declassify more information for scholars to discover, discuss and debate. 

Thum PJ: "Public anger" caused the 1956 riots

It is with some interest that I read the latest assertions by historian Thum PJ on how Lim Chin Siong was wrongfully arrested for inciting a riot in 1956.

According to Thum, he had discovered an archival record which contained the transcript of Lim Chin Siong's speech during the night of the riot and that in this record, Lim Chin Siong did not ask the people to “pah mata” (beat up the police) but wanted the police to join him and his cause. Thum proceeds to assert that the subsequent arrest of Lim is wrong and thus, fits into his persistent historical assessment that Lim was not a communist - although Lim had joined the outlawed communist Anti-British League and rose to prominence in several communist trade unions.

If it was not Lim's fault, than whose fault was it? Why was the crowd so worked up that day and not any other day? Having absolved Lim from all responsibility, Thum's historical investigation is reduced simply to the claim that “public anger was too strong” and therefore the riots occurred.

So the elephant in the room was, why was public anger so strong on that day, as claimed? This, Thum did not bother to find out.

A dusty piece of paper from the colonial archives cannot convey the emotions of a fiery night when words spoken from the podium carry a lot of underlying meanings. One cannot even know the tone that was used. It could be “mai pah mata...” or it could very well be “mai...PAH MATA!”

Only those present at that historical moment can understand what Lim spoke ahout and what he wanted the people to do. If I were to read this historical document now, I would also wonder why I was so angry then. UNLESS you read through the entire document, you will find how words were played with sparks and could possibly set off fire.

And I quote Lim Chin Siong:

“(let's) quickly unite together for tonight there is a possibility that something big will happen. But, dear brothers and sisters, if any of our sons are assaulted we will not tolerate it.”

“We must also use method to get rid of this oppressive Government and to attain our final objective..We must take certain action to retaliate against their oppressive action.”

“Mayday is the workers' struggle for better living and to commemorate past events of bloodshed (believed to be referring to Hock Lee Bus riot). Workers must zealously celebrate and be united to fight to the end.”

As a historian, Thum is entitled to make his assessment. But even my lecturer constantly drilled me to question sources and not make simplistic prima facie assessments from one single historical source.

For example, CPM chief Chin Peng said in his memoirs that left-wing trade unions in Singapore were receiving instructions from the communists. The Plen, Fong Chong Pik, in his memoirs, said that he had a “special acquaintance” with Lim and had met him 3 times. In fact, it was the British Security Council assessment that also pinned Lim as a communist...so Chin Peng, The Plen and the Brits were all lying about the same thing?! So there were no communists, no riots, no bombings? Or all these just random acts of “public anger” also?

Now, for Thum to put the blame of the riot on “public anger” is perhaps somewhat disrespectful to those who there on that night.

Cuz Lim Chin Siong would never lay the blame on the people.

Revising the Revisionists: Operation Coldstore in History

The battle of the minds on Singapore's early Independence history is heating up. After Dr. Thum Ping Tjin's recent assertion that Operation Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise by the PAP to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition in Singapore, another academic Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna has come out questioning Thum's position and research on the issue. This crossing of swords between Singapore's intelligentsia is exciting to say the least and will help in the recovery of Singapore's historical amnesia. 

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The recent controversy over the Indonesian navy’s decision to name a vessel after two marines that had bombed MacDonald House in Singapore on 10 March 1965 is revealing. It has reinforced philosopher George Santayana’s quip that those who cannot remember the past will be condemned to repeat it. The action by the two bombers, Osman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said, killed three Singaporeans and injured 33 others, and was part of the low-intensity war known to posterity as Confrontation. 

This campaign was waged by the left-leaning Indonesian President Sukarno against what he regarded as a British ‘neo-colonial’ challenge to his designs for regional supremacy: the newly inaugurated Federation of Malaysia, which at the time included Singapore. Particularly telling was how much effort the media and several ministers had to invest to enlighten Singaporeans as to why the Indonesian decision was injurious to Singapore’s national dignity. Such collective historical amnesia is not exactly healthy as it renders the body politic vulnerable to distorted versions of defining episodes in our history.

Case in point is another historical episode from the tumultuous 1960s that has received rather sensationalistic treatment recently: the internal security action called Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963, two years before the MacDonald House bombing. History records that Coldstore was mounted to contain the threat to Singapore’s security posed by the Communist United Front then dominating key interest groups. 

Now Ping Tjin Thum (P.J. Thum), a young Singaporean historian, disputes this. He argues instead that Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition that had hitherto offered the only credible electoral challenge to Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP).

This is a good story. But reality was not that straightforward. 

The Context

By the late 1950s, in the midst of the Cold War and post-war decolonization, the British Colonial Office sought to transfer power to local governments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore that would be anti-Communist and friendly to Western geostrategic interests. British Commonwealth forces were meanwhile engaged in a shooting war with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in the jungles of that country. 

South of the Causeway a strong Communist United Front (CUF) had penetrated the Chinese-educated workers’ and students’ associations, as well as the left-wing political party, the PAP, that seemed most likely to win the election for limited self-government in 1959. The British feared that the CUF would ultimately overwhelm the English-educated PAP leadership led by Lee, turning Singapore into a Communist-dominated ‘second Cuba’ in the heart of maritime Southeast Asia.

The Colonial Office in London and Lee hence sought to persuade the politically conservative Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to overcome his fear of upsetting Malay political dominance and power in Malaya with the absorption of Singapore Chinese. To resolve the racial equation, they proposed that the island be absorbed into an expanded Malay Federation that would include the British Borneo territories as well.  The geopolitical calculus was that with control of Singapore’s internal security vested in a staunchly anti-Communist central government in Kuala Lumpur the CPM would be severely curtailed. 

Hence Singapore would develop within the Federation framework in the desired pro-Western, anti-Communist direction.  Because Tunku insisted that Merger with Singapore required its Communists to be first brought to heel, Coldstore was mounted in February 1963. Eight months later, in September, Singapore achieved full independence from the United Kingdom as part of the Federation of Malaysia.

Thum’s Perspective

Thum now appears to question this standard security-driven narrative of Coldstore. His ‘revisionist’ interpretation focuses on PAP leader Lee’s supposed obsession with power and determination to destroy his closest political rival, the charismatic Chinese-speaking ‘progressive leftist’ Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues in the PAP, the unions and other interest associations. 

By late 1962 the supremely crafty Lee had apparently manipulated the British and Tunku into a corner.  In particular, Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore, expressed misgivings that the list of individuals that Lee wanted detained seemed to be targeted simply for being in political opposition.  

Lim Chin Siong especially seemed to be fingered not because of security reasons but because Lee wanted him arrested so that the PAP would win the upcoming general elections. Because the political clock was ticking away, Tunku warned the British in January 1963 that if the Chinese-educated political left in Singapore were not locked away, Merger would be off. An anxious Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys in London thus overruled the objections of Selkirk and Coldstore went ahead.  Politics had trumped security.

Reality Check

There are two main problems with Thum’s argument. First, he argues – citing Selkirk’s contemporaneous concerns - that at the time of Coldstore there was no direct evidence that Lim Chin Siong and other detainees were engaged in actual Communist subversion.  But the records do show that even careful British officials conceded that Lim was a skilful CUF operative and other detainees possessed a recent history of subversive activities. 

Tunku also agreed that the detentions on preventive grounds were necessary. This was prudent. CPM elements within the utterly penetrated Barisan Socialis that was challenging the PAP for power never ruled out switching strategy to armed violence at any time. Historian T.N. Harper hence considers Selkirk’s attempted distinction between ‘political’ and ‘security’ grounds for detention as ‘problematic’. 

Second, Thum emphasizes how Tunku and Selkirk disliked Lee’s personality and byzantine political machinations. But CUF leaders – said to possess ‘animal cunning’ themselves – in fact regarded the tactically agile Lee as the only serious obstacle to their plans to establish Communist rule in Singapore. British envoy in Kuala Lumpur Geofroy Tory sympathized with Lee’s position, warning that playing by ‘Queensbury rules’ with the unscrupulous Communists would be folly.  

Ultimately, cautious British officials in Singapore conceded that in view of what historian S. J. Ball called the ‘ruthless, fast-moving and mendacious’ nature of local politics at the time, Lee Kuan Yew, warts and all, was ‘the only man who can run this city’.

Revising Revisionism

Singapore celebrates its 50th national birthday next year and the nation seems to be in ‘mid-life crisis’, grappling with issues like immigration, national identity and political change. In this light, the appearance of revisionist historical accounts – aided and abetted by the historical amnesia Santayana warned about - is unsurprising.  Nevertheless, perhaps one positive step to begin salving the national mood is more extensive, innovative and creative public education efforts to promote a greater appreciation for and knowledge of our history. 

As part of this process, Operation Coldstore itself must be seen in context – it occurred during a difficult episode in our history amidst a genuinely dangerous period in the Cold War, as evidenced by the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, ongoing advances made by communists in Indochina, the Brunei revolt in December 1962, and of course the Indonesian Konfrontasi from January 1963.  

The revisionist view that Coldstore was utterly driven by Lee’s obsession with political power is hence misleading. A more nuanced analysis suggests that reality at the time was defined by morally complex shades of grey.  Ultimately, following Machiavelli, the moral test of tough policy choices must be whether they benefit a nation in the long run. Fifty-one years on, even critics concede that Singapore has blossomed into a cosmopolitan, politically stable and economically vibrant metropolis. History would therefore - on balance – very likely adjudge that Coldstore passed this test.

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Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Nanyang Technological University. A historian by background, he has published extensively on the struggle against post-war Malayan Communism. He is working on a longer scholarly analysis of Operation Coldstore.