William Cheng: A life of former Special Branch officer

Special Branch Headquarters at Robinson Road (1948-1976)

A Civil Servant and Anti-Communist: William Cheng, former Deputy Superintendent (Special Branch, Police Force), Principal Assistant Secretary (Education), Permanent Secretary (Labour) and first Trade Representative to the Republic of China (Taiwan)

By Mark Wong, Oral History Specialist 

[ORIGINAL ARTICLE is here] 

Former top civil servant William Cheng passed away on 10 November 2010, about a month and a half shy of his 82nd birthday. When the Oral History Centre interviewed him in 1994 for our project, “The Civil Service - A Retrospection”, Cheng recounted some of his most memorable experiences in the public sector, where he began in the Special Branch of the Police Force, moved into the Administrative Service at the ministries of Education and Labour, and later came out of retirement to be a diplomat. What stood out most strongly in his interviews was his role in battling communist elements in the 1950s and 1960s, and how, by the 1970s, a more stable society had developed in part because of the contributions of civil servants like himself.

Born 1928 in mainland China, William Cheng was the son of an official in the Chinese nationalist government. The elder Cheng was the first post-war Chinese Minister to Australia and later appointed Ambassador to Iran. However in 1949, following China’s turn to communism, the elder Cheng resigned from the government and moved his family to Hong Kong. William Cheng was then studying Modern European History at Oxford University, but joined his family in Hong Kong upon his graduation in 1951.

After a year of teaching History at Queen’s College, Hong Kong, William Cheng accepted an assignment to Singapore, which came about as a result of his father’s extensive diplomatic contacts.

“You know […] my father was anti-communist and I am also anti-communist. So at that time Malcolm McDonald was the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia. Now his Deputy […] Christworth was the Secretary of the British Embassy in Iran. So he knew my father well. So my father wrote to Christworth, I think then he took it up with McDonald. And McDonald arranged for me to come over to Singapore […] to fight […] against the communist insurgency. I was put into Special Branch. I joined the Police Force.”.

Having seen his homeland China turn communist, Cheng decided to play a part in preventing Singapore from meeting the same fate. Starting out as Chief Inspector before ending his stint as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cheng spent 11 years at Special Branch from 1953 to 1963. His experience there was almost wholly shaped by the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, marked by intensive underground communist activity against the colonial government. These were dangerous times and Cheng himself had a brush with death, as he recalled:

“I was nearly killed by the communist underground. That was I think in early ’53 or ’54. Now, you know […] next door to Raffles Hotel the Beach Road side, there was a small petrol kiosk. I used to go to that petrol kiosk to get my petrol […] Working at the petrol kiosk was a woman who was a member of the underground. So she succeeded in identifying me as a Special Branch officer which was very high on the hit list of the communist underground […] The plan was that when I went for petrol, two gunmen would come from left and right side and just open fire. I was sitting in the car waiting for my petrol [and] I would be attacked on both sides. So there is no escape. I was lucky […] a week or ten days before they were due to carry out the execution we arrested the Worker’s Protection Corps chief - their section chief. From him we Special Branch recovered a list of car numbers which all belonged to police officers, Special Branch officers down for elimination. And my car number was there.”

As a young officer involved in the intelligence gathering of subversive elements, Cheng was at times tasked to assess where particular public individuals lay on the political spectrum. One early assignment was to evaluate the politics of an up-and-coming young lawyer named Lee Kuan Yew, who, five years later, would become the Prime Minister of Singapore.

“I think it is sometime in 1954. At that time the British were not quite sure how, LKY’s stand was because he was running with the pro-communist front […] The Special Branch at that time […] there was a section called the ESI, English Speaking Intelligent section […] monitoring the English speaking intellectuals in Singapore. The officer-in-charge at that time was a British officer called Finch and I was his number two […] Finch […] arranged to invite LKY over for a drink in his house […] I still remember LKY sat opposite me; Finch on my left and Mrs Lee on my right. Generally we were chitchatting. The main objective was to make an assessment to see whether LKY was a communist or not.

So I was telling LKY… “骑虎难下” - it is easy to ride a tiger but you can’t get off because once you get off you will be eaten by the tiger. So I told LKY that the way he was playing with communist […] was like riding a tiger. When he gets off, I told him, he will be eaten by the communists. And he turned around to me, he said, ‘No, you are wrong. I’ll get off the tiger and I beat the communist.’ That is a very vital statement he said at the time [….] Fortunately he was right and I was wrong. If I was right he would have been eaten by the communist. But I was wrong. So we had Singapore today.” 

Source: Singapore Press Holdings
Just 29 years of age, Lee Kuan Yew (2^nd from left) was gaining a reputation for fighting on the side of workers against unfair treatment by the colonial government. Here, a member of the Singapore Post and Telegraph Uniformed Staff Union is presenting a garland to him at Victoria Memorial Hall, 11 April 1953, after he had successfully represented postal clerks in a wage dispute against the government, which saw the clerks receiving 28 months' back pay.

Cheng’s evaluation of his years at Special Branch was balanced, finding the experience thrilling but also conceding the difficulties of staying too long in this line of work.

“For a short period, yes, it’s very exciting especially dealing with the communist insurgency and United Front. It’s very exciting. But if have been there for 10, 15, 20 [years], I think it’s not good for your mind, ‘cause your vision gets very narrowed. You’re focusing everything on security and nothing else. So I think one spell in Special Branch, or in ISD [Internal Security Department], or in whatever security work should not be more than five years. Too long is no good for you.” 

From the Police Force, he moved on to the Ministry of Education and was appointed Principal Assistant Secretary. Ironically, despite this career change into the Administrative Service, he found himself again dealing with communist elements, this time focusing on student agitators in the schools and universities.

“At that time there were many student societies in Nanyang University, all communist controlled. Then they all affiliate and come under the Nanyang University Students Union […] Outside the university they have the Nanyang University Graduate Association - also communist controlled. So one in[side], one out[side]. They controlled it very, very firmly. They control the flow, the supply of the communist cadres. 

Source: Singapore Press Holdings
Nanyang University was the site of student political activism. In response to a Security Branch crackdown on left-wing student leaders on 26 September 1963, large numbers of students at Nanyang University barricaded the grounds and a riot ensued, resulting in injuries sustained by both students and policemen.

So in order to fight the communist, I was instrumental in forming the Nanyang University Friendship Association […] That time was a very, very difficult task because [of] the fear prevalent in the University. The students - nobody dares to move against the pro-communist students who were very firmly entrenched. But there were a group of students who were very firmly entrenched. But there were a group of students who were very anti. I organised that group of students and they will form the Nanyang University Friendship Association […]

They were the front men fighting them. We broke the hold of the communist grip by using that association [….] Once we start to break the hold, a lot of waverers who were outwardly pro-communist left wing they wanted to come over. Come across. So what we did was that the fellowship groups would identify them, bring them to the Ministry to see me and I assess them their willing[ness] to come over and they want to clear their name. To come clean, we called it.”

By the 1970s, the social-political climate of Singapore had stabilised immensely from a decade or two before. When Cheng took up the appointment of Permanent Secretary (Labour), he found that his job had been made easier by the foundations of tripartism - the relationship of cooperation between unions, employers and the government - that had been laid down before him and led to a new era of industrial peace.

“1971. I went over to Labour. But then when I went to Labour the turbulent years were already over. The unions all settled. The Employment Act was instituted. So it’s a matter of monitoring, to ensure the tripartite relationship […] My duties were actually to maintain harmony in the labour movement. And tripartism to be maintained, which I think was done […] The other [task] is Industrial Safety. These are the two. Because that ties up to safety of the workers, welfare of the workers.”

Cheng retired from the civil service at age 50, but was soon asked by Minister for Labour Ong Pang Boon if he would go to Taiwan to take up a diplomatic appointment. Cheng accepted, becoming Singapore’s Trade Representative to the Republic of China (Taiwan) for nine years (three terms) from 1979-1988.

Spending a total of 36 years in the civil service, Cheng was witness to the many changes in the public sector, from the time Singapore was still a British colony, through the transition period of self government and finally when we attained full independence. During those years, the very essence of what it meant to be a civil servant transformed significantly, as Cheng explained:

“We used to have a joke. The British used to sign their letters and finished, ‘Sir, Your Obedient Servant, Yours so-and-so”. We used to say: you are neither obedient nor servant; you are the law sitting on the people. In those days, when I say civil servants, the top echelons are the British, and the middle and lower echelons were the Asians, the locals. As I said, you aid your masters. The British were overlord. They also acted as overlord. The civil servants were not popular […] in those days the civil servants belong to the ruling class. It’s only the PAP came in the attitude has changed.

So we called ourselves servants. [The] Taiwanese talked about officials in Chinese called ‘官’ [officials] - ‘做官’ [to be an official]. I keep on telling them: Singapore has no ‘官’. We have only civil servants. We have ‘公务员’ [public servants], not ‘官’.”

From London with Love

Dear Editor,

This is my letter:

Two perhaps questionable moves by Tan Jee Say in his early efforts to gather public support for his next run for office -- one is to rely on the widely circulated but maybe questionable research findings of a relatively new professor (Thum Ping Tjin). The other is to parrot what this fresh researcher wrote and said without due diligence of his own, like cross-checking with other historians and sources.

Having recently retired and now splitting my free time between Singapore and London, researching into the social history of Singapore, let me cite just 4 reasons why both Tan and Thum might not get a reply the government:

Firstly, unknown to many non-historians and members of the public, Thum has given a simplistic account of the communist threat and Operation Coldstore in his talks and articles. Thum has ignored several colonial dispatches and Internal Security Council (ISC) minutes that clearly showed the existence of a serious communist threat. Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore and his deputy, Philip Moore, were concerned about the communist threat and had advocated firm action as early as 1960. See for example these extracts from the British archives:

In a May 1960 ISC meeting, Lord Selkirk:

“…expressed his appreciation of the skilful way in which the Singapore Government were trying to deal with the problem of subversion in the trade unions, but said that it was obviously necessary to keep a careful watch on any pressure building up to subvert the TUC [Trade Union Congress].” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 9th Meeting, 19 May 1960 (para 4) (See JPEG Selkirk1)

Later, during another ISC meeting in October 1960, Selkirk commented that the Singapore Government:

“…was faced here by a challenge against the democratic system over the whole of Malaya. To a large extent this challenge was now being made through the trade unions in Singapore. The Government could not allow itself to be knocked about by the Communists acting through the trade unions. The strength of the Government's case was that these people were pressing the Communist cause by subversive methods. By sticking to its line, the Government would emerge stronger in the end. It should not, therefore, be deterred by fears of any temporary unpopularity.” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 14th Meeting, 7 Oct 1960 (para 8) (See JPEG Selkirk2)

Second, whatever reservations Selkirk or his deputy Philip Moore might have had about arresting the communists, they later became fully convinced of the need for security action when more evidence emerged about communist control of the political party Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), the discussion BSS leaders had about the question of armed struggle, and when the BSS came out in support of the armed rebellion in Brunei. On 7 December 1962, a day before the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, Moore wrote:

“I enclose copies of reports which came to us last month from a reliable and well placed source on two meetings held at the headquarters of the Barisan Sosialis last September. These reports are of considerable importance, not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist controlled…It has never been disputed that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front…The report on the first of the two meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends. Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”. CO 1030/1160, Moore to Wallace, 7 Dec 1962 (paras 1 and 2) (See JPEG Selkirk3)

A week later, on 14 December 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

“I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this. Accordingly H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] were prepared to see [arrest] action taken in Singapore…”. CO 1030/1160, Selkirk to SSC, Tel. 582, 14 Dec 1962 (para 5) (See JPEG Selkirk4)

Third, the above British declassified documents show that it is a big folly to read the MI5 report in isolation. Thum Ping Tjin and then Tan Jee Say have brandished the MI5 report without realizing that it should be read in the context of active and robust discussions about the extent of the communist threat. Thum is seized by the MI5 report without considering its context and taking into consideration the totality of evidence. I do hope that Tan Jee Say will reconsider his position, because as a opposition politician and he shouldn't bet so many eggs in this basket. 

Fourth, what Thum (and Tan) fail to realize is that the MI5 report by the British SLO Maurice Williams was not the norm, and it is a gross error of judgment for a historian, even if new, to rely heavily on such a report to make momentous conclusions. Revelations from many sources, including CPM sources, confirmed without a shadow of a doubt, the existence of a communist conspiracy and the communist united front. CPM chief Chin Peng and the Plen had revealed in their books about sabotaging PAP’s plans for merger and Malaysia. The Plen had revealed how he had used the Chinese press to disseminate his opposing views. He also revealed how he had had secret meetings in Jakarta to lead the united front in Singapore and target the PAP for subversion, how he had ordered a top CPM cadre in the Workers Party to resign, and how he had ordered all support for Partai Rakyat to be withdrawn during the 1959 General Election. Chin Peng in turn had disclosed how Deng Xiaoping had ‘advised’ him in July 1961 in Beijing to continue with the armed struggle and how he accepted the ‘advice’ and Deng’s offer of financial help. These are just some facts that clearly contradict the claims by Thum, Tan and others that there was “no evidence” of a communist conspiracy.

Bottomline for all interested readers is this -- we should read new interpretations of history with a curious mind and not take everything at face value. As a Singaporean who has been a long time working resident of London, I will say that the British public is also somewhat skeptical of the British archives because one might never know if ALL documents were declassified or if officials writing the reports have other motivations. Nevertheless, Singaporeans should never forget our own history because if we do, then Singapore would really become just a place for people to make money!

Abdul Salim Rahim

Lim Chin Siong was never a communist...?

As much as LKY wanted him to be a communist, he could never prove LCS as one, conclusively. Even if he was one, he would never publicly admit to be a member of the Communist Party of Malaya as that would land him in jail. The CPM was an outlawed organisation.

Similarly, a gangster would never admit to be a member of a secret society. And because criminal cases against prominent gangsters are so hard to clinch, we often find that these people are held in detention without trial under the CLTP, or what is commonly known as "Section 55" - albeit less controversially as compared to the ISA although technically they are similar.

The Plen, Chin Peng, etc, were clearly communists because they were the top leadership of the hierarchy and they eventually joined the armed struggle in Peace Villages in Southern Thailand. However, other communists who were tasked to work in the Communist United Front weren't so upfront with their allegiances as it was precisely their job to appear leftist, socialist, communalist; anything but communist, in order to continue to manage political affairs from behind the scenes.

How is it possible then for someone to say such and such person is highly likely a communist?

In this entry, we would look at the instances whereby LCS' deeds and association indicated that he could be a communist. While the information was sourced from Albert Lau's article titled "The Battle for Merger-The Historical Context", the original information was actually from various sources such as academic writings, memoirs and other periodicals.

If we read the body of evidence in its entirety, we will find that LCS' links with the communists cannot be simple.

Meeting with The Plen (CPM Singapre Chief) on various occassions

"Within days of the Malayan leader's speech (Tunku AR's speech on formation of Malaysia), Lim Chin Siong conferred with Fang Chuang Pi, one of the communists' top three leaders overseeing Singapore..."[Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse, p227]

"On 16 July (1961), a day after PAP lost Anson (to Workers' Party), Fang Chuang Pi again conferred secretly with Lim Chin Siong. Two days later, an urgent approach was made to see Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner, who invited the pro-communist group, which included Lim and three others, for tea the same day." [Sonny Yap, Richard Lim, and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story of Singapore's Ruling Political Party, pp ix and 323] 

Click to enlarge

A member of the Anti-British League which was communist controlled

"Lim did admit to being a member of the underground Anti-British League (ABL) even though he insisted that "being in the ABL does not mean you are communist"...the ABL was...a dedicated clandestine arm of the CPM set up in September 1948 (after the Emergency was declared) for the purpose of overthrowing the British colonial government...the main duties of ABL members were to "learn revolutionary" and "undergo various clandestine activities such as recruiting new members, distributing flyers and putting up slogans"..They also purchased medicine and supplies to support the CPM's armed struggle."[Melanie Chiew, Leaders of Singapore, p118, Zhong Hua, "A Preliminary Study on the history of Singapore People's Anti-British League and Zhou Guang, 'First Anti-British League group in Singapore Chinese High School in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement; The Legendary Figures of the Singapore People's Anti-British League ]

"According to Bloodworth, Lim had reportedly initiated a Chinese High School student activist, Seet Chay Tuan, into the ABL. Seet "remembered the night the previous year he was summoned to a secret rendezvous...and stood obediently in front of a picture of Stalin pinned to a wooden post, his fist raised, while Chin Siong read out a declaration of allegiance which he was then to swear and sign with his new Party name and so become a full member of the 'Organisation'."" [Bloodworth, p69]

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Oral History of Devan Nair

"Nair recalled how Samad Ismail, a CPM member since 1949, had introduced him to Lim and that "Chin Siong was getting his guidance then from South Johor. Nair, who used to spend his evenings and nights at Lim's Middle Road union headquarters, remembered occasions when "somebody from the underground who is not know to the police" arriving to pass Lim a note. "And Chin Siong would read it and straight away burn it." [Devan Nair, Transcript of Oral History Interview]

Essay of CPM member Zhang Taiyong

"In his essay in the 2013 book, Zhang disclosed that the CPM had transferred Lim from underground activities in the ABL to open front work. After Lim's explusion from the Chinese High School for his role in an examination boycott, he "continued his studies at an English-stream school but later accepted the organisation's decision and devoted himself to trade union movement and constitutional struggle." [Zhang Taiyong, "Our cohort's commander - Lu Yexun" in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement, p61] 

Retired Malaysian Special Branch officer Aloysius Chin

"the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police who held a long-standing watch over the communists in Malaya, also divulged that CPM leaders Siu Cheong and Ah Hoi cited Lim as an example of CPM members who were deployed in open front activities in political parties" [Aloysius Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya, The Inside Story, p67]

Documents in LCS' handwriting

"Two documents in Lim's own handwriting were among several he wrote for CPM records and for the instruction of recruits to the CPM who were under his leadership. One of them was on the talk he gave in the commemoration of Stalin's death. Another contained guidance notes for his ABL subordinates on the CPM's secret journal STUDY." 

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LKY's challenge to LCS after accusing him of being a communist

"Lim Chin Siong issued a signed statement accusing the prime minister of "sensationalism". To Lim's retort that he was "sick and tired" of having to deny association with communists, Lee Kuan Yew gave this risposte at a press conference on 27 January 1962: "If the documents were not written by him, he should deny it, sue me and the Government printers for libel and forgery." Lim never did. 

Click to enlarge

And former Director of Internal Security Branch, Yoong Siew Wah, when writing on his own blog noted the following:

"It was a well-known fact that Lim Chin Siong, the former general secretary of the powerful Singapore Factory & Shop Workers Union was the undisputed leader of the communist united front and controlled the mass base. Lee Kuan Yew could not have been unaware of this fact and knew that he had to depend on Lim Chin Siong and his mass base to advance his political ambition."

So while there are mentions in British archives to suggest that LCS was not a communist, it should be noted that those who say otherwise are aplenty.  

Who orchestrated the Anti-National Service riot of May 1954

Last month, veteran historians CC Chin and Hong Lysa have published their reflections on the role of the Communist Party of Malaya in the events leading up to the National Service Riots of 1954. The battle between these two historians, who hold diametrically opposing views on the CPM’s role, is undoubtedly thought provoking.

According to Chin, the clandestine CPM student movement committee was responsible for leading the Singapore student protest on 13 May 1954 against conscription by the British colonial power. This protest was met with fierce opposition from the colonial government which eventually resulted in 10 students severely beaten up and 48 students arrested by the police. Chin proceeded to pinpoint one CPM cadre Chiam Chong Chian as the person-in-charge of organising the protest on 13 May 1954.

However, in her article on May 19, 2014, Hong rebutted and disagreed that the protest was masterminded and led by the CPM, questioning whether the CPM student movement committee was effective enough to lead the students. Hong argues that Chin’s assertions conveniently support the PAP’s exaggeration of the CPM’s strength which justifies the PAP’s subsequent arrests of suspected communists and sympathisers.

While Hong is entitled to her opinion on the facts of the 13 May protest, Hong’s suggestion that Chin had written his article to support a political position is quite harsh, even in academic circles. Speculation about an opponent’s political affiliations, unfortunately, does not lead to more historical inquiry.

Interestingly, Hong also concedes that historians need more research and recollections from the individuals involved to form a clearer picture of the event.

Recently in February 2014, one such volume of recollection essays by former CPM cadres has been published in Malaysia. The book “Chiam Chong Chian Memorial Collection” edited by Huo Shi and Ding Jing Lei aims to commemorate the life of Chiam, the CPM cadre in-charge of leading the 13 May protest.

Chiam was born in Kuantan, Pahang in 1931 and had come to Singapore to study at the Chinese High School in 1947, where he and many other classmates were recruited into the Anti-British League movement. On 31 May 1950, he evaded arrest by the police and went underground, eventually taking on official CPM work from 1952.

For more Chiam's background, read the earlier post here.

Chiam subsequently went on to incite and direct many of the mass protests in the 1950s, including the student protest on 13 May 1954.

CPM cadre Huo Shi recalled that Chiam had coordinated the 13 May protest by relaying the CPM leadership’s instructions through him to the various cadres organising the protest and other CPM front organisations.

Chiam also conveyed the leadership’s instructions to Huo Shi on the final conditions which would be used to negotiate with the colonial government for the resumption of classes. Huo Shi was operating partially in the open and was the point of contact for the Communist underground.

As a mark of his commitment to the Communist cause, Chiam even risked arrest by going down personally to observe the protest at Chung Cheng High School so as to formulate tactical strategies. Huo Shi wrote that Chiam was nearly arrested but he cleverly used his Malay language to avoid arrest.

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Interestingly, Huo Shi related one incident which suggests that the CPM had come prepared to confront the colonial government and maximise political gain from any outbreak of violence.

Immediately after the 13 May 54 protest, Chiam had handed to Huo Shi 36 photographs of students being beaten by police at the scene of the protest to serve as proof of police brutality. These photos were subsequently reproduced by the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Union and sold to students as keepsakes. The speed at which the photographs were developed and distributed in those days goes to show organised the Communist movement was.

Click on the picture to enlarge

Reading the accounts of these former CPM cadres, it is apparent that the CPM did have a tangible influence on the 13 May student protest. Why then do some individuals try to omit the CPM’s role in the protest?

It could be a result of the secrecy of the CPM’s underground operations, where the risk of arrest by the police forced CPM cadres to masquerade as student activists, thus giving others the impression that the 13 May protest was free from CPM influence.

Ultimately, perhaps one could better deal with this conundrum by remembering that all historical accounts are merely incomplete memories of the past. Some may recall the 13 May protest as a student-led phenomenon, with little knowledge of the political intrigue that went on behind the scenes. Others, like Chiam’s comrades, will remember the event as a time when the CPM struggled against the colonial government through the students, who responded resoundingly in their favour.

The Marxist Sojourn of Comrade Bala

Shocking news gripped the United Kingdom when a 73-year-old man named Aravindan Balakrishnan (aka Comrade Bala) was arrested on suspicion of holding three women captive in a south London flat for 30 years. According to the UK press, the victims were brainwashed by the Marxist Comrade Bala, held against their wishes for years, and were often beaten by Balakrishnan and his wife. 

The three victims were Josephine Herivel (daughter of a renowned Bletchley Park codebreaker during the Second World War), Aishah Wahab (a Colombo plan scholar who came to Britain to study in 1968) and Sian Davies, who died in 1997 (a high-flying law student who studied at Cheltenham Ladies’ College). Having an academic discussion about Marxism is one thing but taking it to the extreme is disconcerting to say the least. Furthermore, the victims being western educated individuals rekindles the point that Communism is not reserved exclusively for the typical Chinese chauvinist but also Western intellectuals who are equally attracted to the ideology.  

In a weird turn of events, the perpetrator of this heinous crime is apparently a Singaporean so obsessed with Marxist ideology that he left for England to set up a commune in the 1960s. By the 1970s, he had worked his way up and became a member of the Communist party of England's central committee. However, he soon left the party in 1974 and set up a separatist group styled as a direct component of Maoist China, calling on the Red army to come to south London to liberate working people. 

Because of his Marxist ideology, the Singapore government deemed him to be pursuing "activities that are prejudicial to the security of Singapore" and stripped of his Singapore citizenship for his close ties with Eurocommunists in 1977 (see below for newspaper clippings). Was this a blessing in disguise for Singapore? No one can say for certain but history has its unique way of eventually unravelling the truth. 

Another interesting point observed was the time period (1960s) in which Balakrishnan left for England. If we recall it was in 1963 that Operation Coldstore was launched to counteract the spread of Communism in Malaya. Was Aravindan Balakrishnan one of those Communists who slipped past the security dragnet and escaped to the United Kingdom?

In the 1960s, the United Kingdom was viewed as a safe haven for Communists and notable local Communists like Lim Chin Siong went into self-exile in the UK after being released from detention. This trend of Communists/Marxists relocating to the UK stretched till the late 70s; the most notable of whom was Singapore Marxist Tan Wah Piow who fled to the UK with forged immigration renewal endorsement and sought political asylum.