What did the Communists say about Operation Coldstore?

So it seems even former Permanent Secretaries, the highest of life form in the public service if you don't want to wear white on white, can't help but to wade into the historical debate. Over the weekend I saw this:

In case you didn't know who's Bilahari, he is none other than retired Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bilahari Kausikan, who by the way gave one a kick-ass speech to the privileged boys at RI. But you wonder why was he talking about a TOC article that was already much talked about in Dec 2013? Maybe he missed out on the party back in Dec?  

Of course the former Permanent Secretary was not alone, and he was quickly rebutted by the rising star of local revisionist historian, Thum PJ:

Anyway, I have earlier written what I think about the current revisionist history here. Maybe both sides are trying too hard to prove the other wrong? One uses (extensively) records from the British Colonial offices and the other quotes history books written by what some may call sanctioned historians. Maybe one should get creative when official records are still held closely by the tightfisted Ministry of Home Affairs...

So what did the communists themselves have to say about Operation Coldstore and the Communist United Front? Has anyone researched the memoirs of former Communists operatives? For example, Chiam Chong Chian, a CPM cadre who was said to orchestrated the May 1954 Anti-National Service riot.

This is what Chin Peng, the former leader of Communist Party of Malaya wrote about Operation Coldstore and Communist United Front:

- Referring to the "numbers of people we controlled" in Singapore in 1959, Chin Peng wrote, "I can certainly say that most of the island's workers sympathized with the left-wing trade unions and members of these unions were well appreciated they were under the control of the CPM. (p.409).

- On plans to sabotage merger, Chin Peng, Siao Chang and Eu Chooi Yip had a discussion in Beijing in mid-1961. Chin Peng wrote: "Our Peking meeting also examined in the detail the Malaysia Plan that was being hatched between London and Kuala Lumpur. The three of us came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interest of our Party if we plotted to sabotage this. If we couldn't derail it, at least we might substantially delay its implementation." (p. 437) (This is in line with what the Plen and Lim Chin Siong did in Singapore to frustrate merger?)

- On Operation Coldstore, Chin Peng wrote that it "shattered our underground network throughout the island. Those who escaped the police net went into hiding. Many fled to Indonesia." (p.439) (The clearest admission by CPM that those arrested were CPM or CUF members?)

The leader of Communist Party of Malaya in Singapore, Fong Chong Pik, better known as The Plen, also wrote about Singapore's security situation from the mid 50s to 60s:

- The Plen wrote that at a secret meeting with other CPM leaders in Jakarta in 1957 (after the the 1954-1956 strikes, demonstrations and riots): "We were informed that the Central Committee took a positive view of the widespread development of the open mass movement in Singapore and sent its praises." (p.124) (That is, CPM approve of what their front men had been instigating in Singapore in the mid-50s.)

- The Plen wrote that the CPM "central leadership had decided to establish a working group...to directly and completely lead the struggle in Singapore" and that "both he [Eu Chooi Yip] and I had been appointed to the working group". (p. 122) (This reiterates CPM role behind the scenes in Singapore.)

- The Plan frankly revealed that he had used the Chinese press to delay merger. He wrote: "A lot of opinions expressed in the newspapers originated from me. These included slowing down the process of merger, and adopting the form of confederation." (p.161) (Wonder if revisionist historians can spot The Plen writing in the newspapers?)

- On his relationship with Lim Chin Siong, who was said to the CPM open front leader, the Plen wrote cryptically, "LIm Chin Siong and I did have a "definitely not normal association" and that Lim was a person "with whom I have had a special acquaintance." (pp. 170, 176-177)

  

All this debate and research is a good sign for the understanding of Singapore's history, especially the period of 50s and 60s where there has been a lack of neutral scholarly work. While some say that there was no communist conspiracy in Singapore's pre-independence political landscape, the memoirs of several communists leaders and operatives had indicated that they were active in the fight for independence of Singapore and against the LKY's idea of merger with Malaysia.

Maybe next year when Singapore celebrates our 50th birthday, the government would decide to declassify more information for scholars to discover, discuss and debate. 

Who orchestrated the Anti-National Service riot of May 1954

Last month, veteran historians CC Chin and Hong Lysa have published their reflections on the role of the Communist Party of Malaya in the events leading up to the National Service Riots of 1954. The battle between these two historians, who hold diametrically opposing views on the CPM’s role, is undoubtedly thought provoking.

According to Chin, the clandestine CPM student movement committee was responsible for leading the Singapore student protest on 13 May 1954 against conscription by the British colonial power. This protest was met with fierce opposition from the colonial government which eventually resulted in 10 students severely beaten up and 48 students arrested by the police. Chin proceeded to pinpoint one CPM cadre Chiam Chong Chian as the person-in-charge of organising the protest on 13 May 1954.

However, in her article on May 19, 2014, Hong rebutted and disagreed that the protest was masterminded and led by the CPM, questioning whether the CPM student movement committee was effective enough to lead the students. Hong argues that Chin’s assertions conveniently support the PAP’s exaggeration of the CPM’s strength which justifies the PAP’s subsequent arrests of suspected communists and sympathisers.

While Hong is entitled to her opinion on the facts of the 13 May protest, Hong’s suggestion that Chin had written his article to support a political position is quite harsh, even in academic circles. Speculation about an opponent’s political affiliations, unfortunately, does not lead to more historical inquiry.

Interestingly, Hong also concedes that historians need more research and recollections from the individuals involved to form a clearer picture of the event.

Recently in February 2014, one such volume of recollection essays by former CPM cadres has been published in Malaysia. The book “Chiam Chong Chian Memorial Collection” edited by Huo Shi and Ding Jing Lei aims to commemorate the life of Chiam, the CPM cadre in-charge of leading the 13 May protest.

Chiam was born in Kuantan, Pahang in 1931 and had come to Singapore to study at the Chinese High School in 1947, where he and many other classmates were recruited into the Anti-British League movement. On 31 May 1950, he evaded arrest by the police and went underground, eventually taking on official CPM work from 1952.

For more Chiam's background, read the earlier post here.

Chiam subsequently went on to incite and direct many of the mass protests in the 1950s, including the student protest on 13 May 1954.

CPM cadre Huo Shi recalled that Chiam had coordinated the 13 May protest by relaying the CPM leadership’s instructions through him to the various cadres organising the protest and other CPM front organisations.

Chiam also conveyed the leadership’s instructions to Huo Shi on the final conditions which would be used to negotiate with the colonial government for the resumption of classes. Huo Shi was operating partially in the open and was the point of contact for the Communist underground.

As a mark of his commitment to the Communist cause, Chiam even risked arrest by going down personally to observe the protest at Chung Cheng High School so as to formulate tactical strategies. Huo Shi wrote that Chiam was nearly arrested but he cleverly used his Malay language to avoid arrest.

Click on the picture to enlarge

Interestingly, Huo Shi related one incident which suggests that the CPM had come prepared to confront the colonial government and maximise political gain from any outbreak of violence.

Immediately after the 13 May 54 protest, Chiam had handed to Huo Shi 36 photographs of students being beaten by police at the scene of the protest to serve as proof of police brutality. These photos were subsequently reproduced by the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Union and sold to students as keepsakes. The speed at which the photographs were developed and distributed in those days goes to show organised the Communist movement was.

Click on the picture to enlarge

Reading the accounts of these former CPM cadres, it is apparent that the CPM did have a tangible influence on the 13 May student protest. Why then do some individuals try to omit the CPM’s role in the protest?

It could be a result of the secrecy of the CPM’s underground operations, where the risk of arrest by the police forced CPM cadres to masquerade as student activists, thus giving others the impression that the 13 May protest was free from CPM influence.

Ultimately, perhaps one could better deal with this conundrum by remembering that all historical accounts are merely incomplete memories of the past. Some may recall the 13 May protest as a student-led phenomenon, with little knowledge of the political intrigue that went on behind the scenes. Others, like Chiam’s comrades, will remember the event as a time when the CPM struggled against the colonial government through the students, who responded resoundingly in their favour.

A portrait of the struggling life of Chiam Chong Chian

The following is a loose translation of the biography of Chiam Chong Chian, who was an underground CPM cadre leader in Malaya during the 1950s.

Born in Kuantan, Pahang, Malaya in 1931, Chiam Chong Chian was a Malayan son that died on PRC soil because of the tumultuous struggle for independence and the battle between nationalists and communism during the 1950s and 1960s.

Chiam was the third child in a Hainanese family of six children. His father came to Malaya at the end of the 19th century, first becoming a baker and later a plantation supervisor.

Chiam was only 11 or 12 when the Japanese invaded Malaya during WWII. During that time, Chiam followed his family to hide in jungle and began to lived off the land. He joined the adults in hunting, fishing and delivering supplies while entertainment was Chinese classic stories of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin.

In 1946, after the war had ended, Chiam returned to school in Kuantan and a year later enrolled in Chinese High Singapore. Not only were Chiam's results good, he was also charismatic and well-liked by fellow students. He was surrounded by a group of close friends who would later become his comrades. Many of these friends would later end up as liaison officials (with overseas Chinese) in China after the Chinese Communists took power.

1950 was a watershed year for Chiam who was senior high year 2. There was a surge in anti-colonial sentiments and seniors like him began to infect the younger ones in Chinese High with the need for Malaya's independence.

As the waves of anti-colonialism continued unabated, authorities began the clamp down of student activism with the closing of Chinese High, shutting down of student organizations, arresting progressive teachers and students and the expulsion of 50 senior high school student activists with Chiam being one of them.

On May 31, 1950, when military police surrounded the school to arrest them, Chiam was hidden in the school canteen by student sympathizers and managed to escape the school. As the surrounding area of Chinese High were houses of wealthy residents who typically employed Hainanese as housekeepers, Chiam was able to escape the dragnet by seeking help from his kinsmen.

From then on, Chiam bade farewell to his student life and joined the communist underground to battle against the British colonial power and achieve independence for Malaya.

In 1951, Chiam returned to Kuantan to teach in a primary school. He was humble, well-liked and earned the respect of the students. On the side, Chiam continued to work for the Communist Party of Malaya and received instructions to carry out reporting and research for the party.

In 1952, Chiam began to be tasked by the party to carry out organization work and operations. As he was passionate, responsible and honest, he was trusted by the party and began to take on more responsibilities. Under Chiam's leadership, the political environment began to open up and progress was made with mobilization of the masses.

In the early 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew began to work in cahoots with the British colonial power to exterminate the communists. Chiam was forced under these circumstances to escape to Indonesia.

When in Indonesia, he faced immense difficulties as he was unfamiliar with the country and did not speak the language. The 30 Sep 1965 purging of the Communists, where tens of thousands of Indonesian Communists were killed by the Indonesian military, made his situation increasingly unbearable.

To exacerbate matters, Cultural Revolution erupted in China and Chiam was criticized for his previous actions. He was criticized for his wrongdoings, forced to apologized and ostracized from the party. But he was said to be steadfast and hung on to his beliefs, never betrayed his comrades even though he was exiled from the party and lead a precarious life.

The only consolation Chiam had was in the mid-1990s when CPM leader Chin Peng met Chiam in a Guangzhou hotel. Chin reverted previous criticisms of Chiam and reaffirmed Chiam's lifetime commitment to the Communist cause.

Chiam passed away on Apr 26, 1998, due to multiple illnesses. He was 68 years old.

38 Years on: Goh Lay Kuan The Red Ballerina

Browsing the Straits Times forum section yesterday, I was surprised to see a letter talking about Goh Lay Kuan and her arrest under the ISA in 1976, written by Lionel De Souza. Mr De Souza, a former policeman, is apparently someone close to the establishment; and one does wonder why the sudden need to bring up the fact that Goh, who is also wife of Kuo Pao Kun, joined a splinter group of the CPM and visited a communist training camp in 1975. 

 

 

It was only with careful reading of the recent ST interview of Goh Lay Kuan that one can conjecture the deeper meaning behind the letter. In that interview with Goh dated 3 May 2014, she said ISD was looking to detain those who had received communist military training and she was lucky that she didn't know how to draw a gun.

 

 

 

 

This was despite the fact that she had met a high ranking communist cadre named Sister Fong and together they made a trip to a communist guerrilla military camp in the Malaysia-Thailand border where Goh received instructions from Fong to recruit more members and raise funds.

Goh made another interesting claim during the recent ST interview. She said she "overturned" tables when she was being interviewed by ISD officers. I am not sure whether Goh meant it in the literal sense of the word, or was it figurative?

Nevertheless, after this supposedly valiant act, she submissively went on national TV to "confess" her role in the communist plot and also pinpoint others who were involved. It must be day and night to go from overturning tables to appearing meekly on TV; but alas only those who were there would really know the truth.

Moving to the larger picture, Goh was one of the 50 people arrested in that operation. These 50 were charged with being affiliated to a group trying to rekindle the cause of communist subversion and terrorism. The group was the Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), a violent splinter group of the Communist Party of Malaya. Items seized from this group include, field directives, photographs of communist guerillas training in Malaysia-Thailand border, cash, booby-trap paraphernalia, including detonators and sketches of military installations.

Earlier in June 1974, another ISD operation nabbed 31 members of the same group, MNLF, and seized one pistol, 42 bullets, one hand grenade, 16 detonators, 3 homemade bombs and 5 improvised detonators.

Historically speaking, there was no definitive answer to say Goh was guilty or not, because the group was arrested before they could carry out any real attacks. But, it would be injustice to history if a reader reads the ST interview at face value, without understanding the facts behind the event.

Thum PJ: "Public anger" caused the 1956 riots

It is with some interest that I read the latest assertions by historian Thum PJ on how Lim Chin Siong was wrongfully arrested for inciting a riot in 1956.

According to Thum, he had discovered an archival record which contained the transcript of Lim Chin Siong's speech during the night of the riot and that in this record, Lim Chin Siong did not ask the people to “pah mata” (beat up the police) but wanted the police to join him and his cause. Thum proceeds to assert that the subsequent arrest of Lim is wrong and thus, fits into his persistent historical assessment that Lim was not a communist - although Lim had joined the outlawed communist Anti-British League and rose to prominence in several communist trade unions.

If it was not Lim's fault, than whose fault was it? Why was the crowd so worked up that day and not any other day? Having absolved Lim from all responsibility, Thum's historical investigation is reduced simply to the claim that “public anger was too strong” and therefore the riots occurred.

So the elephant in the room was, why was public anger so strong on that day, as claimed? This, Thum did not bother to find out.

A dusty piece of paper from the colonial archives cannot convey the emotions of a fiery night when words spoken from the podium carry a lot of underlying meanings. One cannot even know the tone that was used. It could be “mai pah mata...” or it could very well be “mai...PAH MATA!”

Only those present at that historical moment can understand what Lim spoke ahout and what he wanted the people to do. If I were to read this historical document now, I would also wonder why I was so angry then. UNLESS you read through the entire document, you will find how words were played with sparks and could possibly set off fire.

And I quote Lim Chin Siong:

“(let's) quickly unite together for tonight there is a possibility that something big will happen. But, dear brothers and sisters, if any of our sons are assaulted we will not tolerate it.”

“We must also use method to get rid of this oppressive Government and to attain our final objective..We must take certain action to retaliate against their oppressive action.”

“Mayday is the workers' struggle for better living and to commemorate past events of bloodshed (believed to be referring to Hock Lee Bus riot). Workers must zealously celebrate and be united to fight to the end.”

As a historian, Thum is entitled to make his assessment. But even my lecturer constantly drilled me to question sources and not make simplistic prima facie assessments from one single historical source.

For example, CPM chief Chin Peng said in his memoirs that left-wing trade unions in Singapore were receiving instructions from the communists. The Plen, Fong Chong Pik, in his memoirs, said that he had a “special acquaintance” with Lim and had met him 3 times. In fact, it was the British Security Council assessment that also pinned Lim as a communist...so Chin Peng, The Plen and the Brits were all lying about the same thing?! So there were no communists, no riots, no bombings? Or all these just random acts of “public anger” also?

Now, for Thum to put the blame of the riot on “public anger” is perhaps somewhat disrespectful to those who there on that night.

Cuz Lim Chin Siong would never lay the blame on the people.

A Second Glance: United Front Were No Communists

Last week, Singapore alternative online news outlet The Online Citizen published an article titled United Front were no communists: British intelligence. In gist, the article revealed the contents of a British classified document illustrating Maurice LB Williams, the Security Liaison Officer (title of the Head of the British intelligence unit, MI5 office in Singapore), evaluating the evidence presented by the Singapore Special Branch on the security situation in Singapore in 1962. 

In his report, Maurice LB Williams evaluated that the United Front was not being dictated to or controlled by the communists and this ran counter to the PAP government’s claim that the opposition was involved in a communist conspiracy to topple the government. Maurice also mentioned that "they are united only in their dissatisfactions with the P.A.P. Government, and they cannot be considered to form a monolithic Communist edifice under strict Party management ".

This is no doubt an interesting perspective that would spur readers to delve further into this topic and inject much needed academic vigour and vibrancy into this phase of Singapore's history. It is strange though for a MI5 officer to expect a "monolithic Communist edifice under strict Party management" as a smoking gun when these trade unions, as well as peasant and student organisations were simply proxies of the CPM. Did Maurice honestly expect the CPM to officially subsume the United Front and legitimize police action against them? Maurice's assessment is all the more confounding when Chin Peng himself admitted that "most of the island's workers sympathized with the left-wing trade unions and members of these unions well appreciated they were under the control of the CPM".

CPM's control of the United Front is further supported by the memoirs of high ranking CPM cadre Fong Chong Pik (aka The Plen) when he admitted to having a special acquaintance with Lim Chin Siong, the top United Front leader in Singapore.     

However, like in all historical academic writing, one should be cognizant of the need to present evidence from multiple sources rather than depend on only those that fits one's assertion. As the Security Liaison Officer in Singapore, Maurice must have sent more than one report back to the Colonial Office and it would be beneficial to review all his reports for a complete view on Singapore's then security situation rather than cast judgment based on a singular report. 

Moreover, the launching of Operation Coldstore was ordered by the Internal Security Council comprising of governmental representatives from the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Any decision taken by the council must be approved by the majority of council members and in the case of Coldstore the decision was unanimous. Hence, Maurice's single assessment may not represent the final assessment made by the British government.

Having said these, I like to introduce a few more interesting excerpts from CPM leader Chin Peng's autobiography My Side Of History which unexpectedly contradicts MI5's assessment.

In his book, Chin Peng gave a stoic assessment of Operation Coldstore. He described Operation Coldstore as Lee Kuan Yew lowering "the boom on the CPM" and that it "shattered our underground network throughout the island". In saying this, Chin Peng recognised that the main target of Coldstore was the CPM and admitted to the efficacy of Operation Coldstore in eradicating the Communist influence in Singapore. Ironically, these statements by Chin Peng go against recent articles by Dr Thum Ping Tjin who asserted that Operation Coldstore was a crackdown on political dissidents in Singapore.

In spite of Chin Peng's acknowledgement for Operation Coldstore, he categorically denied having any direct control over the Barisan Socialis. Chin Peng also refuted allegations that politicians like Dr Lee Siew Choh nor other prominent figures like the Puthucheary brothers had ever been CPM members. He did however admit to influencing these politicians.

Note: Dr Lee Siew Choh, Party Chief of Barisan Socialis was never arrested under the ISA 

             

This is where the play with semantics occur. When can one be considered a Communist or not a Communist? Can someone qualify to be a Communist if one is inclined to the ideology or does one have to be a card-carrying member? This is a question for readers to ruminate on and arrive at their own conclusions.

To conclude, rather than give clarity to this tumultuous period of Singapore history, TOC's article raises more doubts than answers. Hence, it is up to all like-minded history buffs to sieve through the numerous resources available and hopefully piece together a balance and credible narrative for all Singaporeans.

 

Mystery Behind Tan Wah Piow's Flower Wreath

On 29 September 2013, theonlinecitizen.com published an article claiming that Tan Wah Piow denies having sent the flower wreath to Chin Peng's funeral. Aside from his denial, Tan added that "the Sin Chew report was ... publicised in a Singapore blog which was devoted to demonising me and those detained in 1987 Operation Spectrum as 'Marxist conspirators'".

Upon reading this, the history buff in me came alive, ever so hopeful to find another like-minded individual who blogs about such long forgotten historical issues. Alas to my dismay, a simple search on the internet turned up only two blogs which mentioned the Sin Chew report. My own blog and another titled Where Bears Roam Free which carried a rather dim view of Tan Wah Piow, calling him "a commie sympathizer" who "achieved nuthin in life". The commentary may be crass but to each his own.

Just to clarify, my interest in this long forgotten past of Singapore is rooted in facts scoured from openly available resources and painstakingly pieced together as a coherent whole for the reading pleasure of like-minded history buffs.

From this latest development, the question that begets me was: "why would anybody "plot" against Tan Wah Piow'"? There are a few plausible conjectures:

Firstly, there may be the possible involvement of the Malaysian tabloids. The media focus after Chin Peng's death revolved around the Malaysian authorities' refusal to allow him back in to Malaysia. What better way to differentiate oneself from the other run of the mill press articles than to get a firsthand scoop of Chin Peng's close affiliation with Singapore activist Tan Wah Piow? In this cut throat industry, reporters are constantly looking for new sexy angles to publish their articles and we should not be surprised at what reporters are willing to do.

Secondly, there is also the nefarious possibility that the Malaysian authorities are the orchestrators behind this entire facade. The mounting flak heaped on the Malaysian government after their high-handed handling of Chin Peng's passing, the Malaysian authorities turned to their favourite bogeyman Singapore to deflect some of this negative attention. Just recall the number of times Malaysia made use of little brother Singapore during periods of domestic crisis and such a plot is not entirely impossible.

The third possibility may be as what Tan Wah Piow claims and "the person or persons behind the “mysterious wreath” falls on his “detractors in [Singapore]", in particular the Singapore government. On account of the past antagonism Tan Wah Piow had with the Singapore government, the government of Singapore does indeed have an axe to grind.

But then again, my lonely sojourn on this part of Singapore's history reflects an unfortunately dismal public and academic interest in this topic. Hence, this "sleek piece of dark propaganda" appears rough at the edges and only succeeds in shining the spotlight on the Singapore government. An ill-conceived move like this by the Singapore government ultimately provides a platform for Tan to hit back at his detractors and backfires spectacularly on the Singapore government.

This brings us to the last possibility where Tan Wah Piow staged this entire show to bring further attention to his case. Having explained the negative trade offs for the Singapore government in the previous point and the somewhat unsophisticated method employed, this potential soliloquy by Tan Wah Piow should not be rejected outright.

If we were to juxtapose Tan's public denials of being a member of the Communist Party of Malaya together with his penchant for offering assistance to known CPM elements in the past, Tan Wah Piow's words and actions do not often go hand in hand. Just as the Singapore government has an axe to grind with Tan Wah Piow, I am sure Tan is no pushover either.

All these are but speculative talk and the mystery of the flower wreath remains unresolved. What we do know for sure is the attempt by someone to leverage on the death of an old man to further their own selfish agenda.