William Cheng: A life of former Special Branch officer

Special Branch Headquarters at Robinson Road (1948-1976)

A Civil Servant and Anti-Communist: William Cheng, former Deputy Superintendent (Special Branch, Police Force), Principal Assistant Secretary (Education), Permanent Secretary (Labour) and first Trade Representative to the Republic of China (Taiwan)

By Mark Wong, Oral History Specialist 

[ORIGINAL ARTICLE is here] 

Former top civil servant William Cheng passed away on 10 November 2010, about a month and a half shy of his 82nd birthday. When the Oral History Centre interviewed him in 1994 for our project, “The Civil Service - A Retrospection”, Cheng recounted some of his most memorable experiences in the public sector, where he began in the Special Branch of the Police Force, moved into the Administrative Service at the ministries of Education and Labour, and later came out of retirement to be a diplomat. What stood out most strongly in his interviews was his role in battling communist elements in the 1950s and 1960s, and how, by the 1970s, a more stable society had developed in part because of the contributions of civil servants like himself.

Born 1928 in mainland China, William Cheng was the son of an official in the Chinese nationalist government. The elder Cheng was the first post-war Chinese Minister to Australia and later appointed Ambassador to Iran. However in 1949, following China’s turn to communism, the elder Cheng resigned from the government and moved his family to Hong Kong. William Cheng was then studying Modern European History at Oxford University, but joined his family in Hong Kong upon his graduation in 1951.

After a year of teaching History at Queen’s College, Hong Kong, William Cheng accepted an assignment to Singapore, which came about as a result of his father’s extensive diplomatic contacts.

“You know […] my father was anti-communist and I am also anti-communist. So at that time Malcolm McDonald was the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia. Now his Deputy […] Christworth was the Secretary of the British Embassy in Iran. So he knew my father well. So my father wrote to Christworth, I think then he took it up with McDonald. And McDonald arranged for me to come over to Singapore […] to fight […] against the communist insurgency. I was put into Special Branch. I joined the Police Force.”.

Having seen his homeland China turn communist, Cheng decided to play a part in preventing Singapore from meeting the same fate. Starting out as Chief Inspector before ending his stint as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cheng spent 11 years at Special Branch from 1953 to 1963. His experience there was almost wholly shaped by the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, marked by intensive underground communist activity against the colonial government. These were dangerous times and Cheng himself had a brush with death, as he recalled:

“I was nearly killed by the communist underground. That was I think in early ’53 or ’54. Now, you know […] next door to Raffles Hotel the Beach Road side, there was a small petrol kiosk. I used to go to that petrol kiosk to get my petrol […] Working at the petrol kiosk was a woman who was a member of the underground. So she succeeded in identifying me as a Special Branch officer which was very high on the hit list of the communist underground […] The plan was that when I went for petrol, two gunmen would come from left and right side and just open fire. I was sitting in the car waiting for my petrol [and] I would be attacked on both sides. So there is no escape. I was lucky […] a week or ten days before they were due to carry out the execution we arrested the Worker’s Protection Corps chief - their section chief. From him we Special Branch recovered a list of car numbers which all belonged to police officers, Special Branch officers down for elimination. And my car number was there.”

As a young officer involved in the intelligence gathering of subversive elements, Cheng was at times tasked to assess where particular public individuals lay on the political spectrum. One early assignment was to evaluate the politics of an up-and-coming young lawyer named Lee Kuan Yew, who, five years later, would become the Prime Minister of Singapore.

“I think it is sometime in 1954. At that time the British were not quite sure how, LKY’s stand was because he was running with the pro-communist front […] The Special Branch at that time […] there was a section called the ESI, English Speaking Intelligent section […] monitoring the English speaking intellectuals in Singapore. The officer-in-charge at that time was a British officer called Finch and I was his number two […] Finch […] arranged to invite LKY over for a drink in his house […] I still remember LKY sat opposite me; Finch on my left and Mrs Lee on my right. Generally we were chitchatting. The main objective was to make an assessment to see whether LKY was a communist or not.

So I was telling LKY… “骑虎难下” - it is easy to ride a tiger but you can’t get off because once you get off you will be eaten by the tiger. So I told LKY that the way he was playing with communist […] was like riding a tiger. When he gets off, I told him, he will be eaten by the communists. And he turned around to me, he said, ‘No, you are wrong. I’ll get off the tiger and I beat the communist.’ That is a very vital statement he said at the time [….] Fortunately he was right and I was wrong. If I was right he would have been eaten by the communist. But I was wrong. So we had Singapore today.” 

Source: Singapore Press Holdings
Just 29 years of age, Lee Kuan Yew (2^nd from left) was gaining a reputation for fighting on the side of workers against unfair treatment by the colonial government. Here, a member of the Singapore Post and Telegraph Uniformed Staff Union is presenting a garland to him at Victoria Memorial Hall, 11 April 1953, after he had successfully represented postal clerks in a wage dispute against the government, which saw the clerks receiving 28 months' back pay.

Cheng’s evaluation of his years at Special Branch was balanced, finding the experience thrilling but also conceding the difficulties of staying too long in this line of work.

“For a short period, yes, it’s very exciting especially dealing with the communist insurgency and United Front. It’s very exciting. But if have been there for 10, 15, 20 [years], I think it’s not good for your mind, ‘cause your vision gets very narrowed. You’re focusing everything on security and nothing else. So I think one spell in Special Branch, or in ISD [Internal Security Department], or in whatever security work should not be more than five years. Too long is no good for you.” 

From the Police Force, he moved on to the Ministry of Education and was appointed Principal Assistant Secretary. Ironically, despite this career change into the Administrative Service, he found himself again dealing with communist elements, this time focusing on student agitators in the schools and universities.

“At that time there were many student societies in Nanyang University, all communist controlled. Then they all affiliate and come under the Nanyang University Students Union […] Outside the university they have the Nanyang University Graduate Association - also communist controlled. So one in[side], one out[side]. They controlled it very, very firmly. They control the flow, the supply of the communist cadres. 

Source: Singapore Press Holdings
Nanyang University was the site of student political activism. In response to a Security Branch crackdown on left-wing student leaders on 26 September 1963, large numbers of students at Nanyang University barricaded the grounds and a riot ensued, resulting in injuries sustained by both students and policemen.

So in order to fight the communist, I was instrumental in forming the Nanyang University Friendship Association […] That time was a very, very difficult task because [of] the fear prevalent in the University. The students - nobody dares to move against the pro-communist students who were very firmly entrenched. But there were a group of students who were very firmly entrenched. But there were a group of students who were very anti. I organised that group of students and they will form the Nanyang University Friendship Association […]

They were the front men fighting them. We broke the hold of the communist grip by using that association [….] Once we start to break the hold, a lot of waverers who were outwardly pro-communist left wing they wanted to come over. Come across. So what we did was that the fellowship groups would identify them, bring them to the Ministry to see me and I assess them their willing[ness] to come over and they want to clear their name. To come clean, we called it.”

By the 1970s, the social-political climate of Singapore had stabilised immensely from a decade or two before. When Cheng took up the appointment of Permanent Secretary (Labour), he found that his job had been made easier by the foundations of tripartism - the relationship of cooperation between unions, employers and the government - that had been laid down before him and led to a new era of industrial peace.

“1971. I went over to Labour. But then when I went to Labour the turbulent years were already over. The unions all settled. The Employment Act was instituted. So it’s a matter of monitoring, to ensure the tripartite relationship […] My duties were actually to maintain harmony in the labour movement. And tripartism to be maintained, which I think was done […] The other [task] is Industrial Safety. These are the two. Because that ties up to safety of the workers, welfare of the workers.”

Cheng retired from the civil service at age 50, but was soon asked by Minister for Labour Ong Pang Boon if he would go to Taiwan to take up a diplomatic appointment. Cheng accepted, becoming Singapore’s Trade Representative to the Republic of China (Taiwan) for nine years (three terms) from 1979-1988.

Spending a total of 36 years in the civil service, Cheng was witness to the many changes in the public sector, from the time Singapore was still a British colony, through the transition period of self government and finally when we attained full independence. During those years, the very essence of what it meant to be a civil servant transformed significantly, as Cheng explained:

“We used to have a joke. The British used to sign their letters and finished, ‘Sir, Your Obedient Servant, Yours so-and-so”. We used to say: you are neither obedient nor servant; you are the law sitting on the people. In those days, when I say civil servants, the top echelons are the British, and the middle and lower echelons were the Asians, the locals. As I said, you aid your masters. The British were overlord. They also acted as overlord. The civil servants were not popular […] in those days the civil servants belong to the ruling class. It’s only the PAP came in the attitude has changed.

So we called ourselves servants. [The] Taiwanese talked about officials in Chinese called ‘官’ [officials] - ‘做官’ [to be an official]. I keep on telling them: Singapore has no ‘官’. We have only civil servants. We have ‘公务员’ [public servants], not ‘官’.”

Lim Chin Siong was never a communist...?

As much as LKY wanted him to be a communist, he could never prove LCS as one, conclusively. Even if he was one, he would never publicly admit to be a member of the Communist Party of Malaya as that would land him in jail. The CPM was an outlawed organisation.

Similarly, a gangster would never admit to be a member of a secret society. And because criminal cases against prominent gangsters are so hard to clinch, we often find that these people are held in detention without trial under the CLTP, or what is commonly known as "Section 55" - albeit less controversially as compared to the ISA although technically they are similar.

The Plen, Chin Peng, etc, were clearly communists because they were the top leadership of the hierarchy and they eventually joined the armed struggle in Peace Villages in Southern Thailand. However, other communists who were tasked to work in the Communist United Front weren't so upfront with their allegiances as it was precisely their job to appear leftist, socialist, communalist; anything but communist, in order to continue to manage political affairs from behind the scenes.

How is it possible then for someone to say such and such person is highly likely a communist?

In this entry, we would look at the instances whereby LCS' deeds and association indicated that he could be a communist. While the information was sourced from Albert Lau's article titled "The Battle for Merger-The Historical Context", the original information was actually from various sources such as academic writings, memoirs and other periodicals.

If we read the body of evidence in its entirety, we will find that LCS' links with the communists cannot be simple.

Meeting with The Plen (CPM Singapre Chief) on various occassions

"Within days of the Malayan leader's speech (Tunku AR's speech on formation of Malaysia), Lim Chin Siong conferred with Fang Chuang Pi, one of the communists' top three leaders overseeing Singapore..."[Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse, p227]

"On 16 July (1961), a day after PAP lost Anson (to Workers' Party), Fang Chuang Pi again conferred secretly with Lim Chin Siong. Two days later, an urgent approach was made to see Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner, who invited the pro-communist group, which included Lim and three others, for tea the same day." [Sonny Yap, Richard Lim, and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story of Singapore's Ruling Political Party, pp ix and 323] 

Click to enlarge

A member of the Anti-British League which was communist controlled

"Lim did admit to being a member of the underground Anti-British League (ABL) even though he insisted that "being in the ABL does not mean you are communist"...the ABL was...a dedicated clandestine arm of the CPM set up in September 1948 (after the Emergency was declared) for the purpose of overthrowing the British colonial government...the main duties of ABL members were to "learn revolutionary" and "undergo various clandestine activities such as recruiting new members, distributing flyers and putting up slogans"..They also purchased medicine and supplies to support the CPM's armed struggle."[Melanie Chiew, Leaders of Singapore, p118, Zhong Hua, "A Preliminary Study on the history of Singapore People's Anti-British League and Zhou Guang, 'First Anti-British League group in Singapore Chinese High School in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement; The Legendary Figures of the Singapore People's Anti-British League ]

"According to Bloodworth, Lim had reportedly initiated a Chinese High School student activist, Seet Chay Tuan, into the ABL. Seet "remembered the night the previous year he was summoned to a secret rendezvous...and stood obediently in front of a picture of Stalin pinned to a wooden post, his fist raised, while Chin Siong read out a declaration of allegiance which he was then to swear and sign with his new Party name and so become a full member of the 'Organisation'."" [Bloodworth, p69]

Click to enlarge

Oral History of Devan Nair

"Nair recalled how Samad Ismail, a CPM member since 1949, had introduced him to Lim and that "Chin Siong was getting his guidance then from South Johor. Nair, who used to spend his evenings and nights at Lim's Middle Road union headquarters, remembered occasions when "somebody from the underground who is not know to the police" arriving to pass Lim a note. "And Chin Siong would read it and straight away burn it." [Devan Nair, Transcript of Oral History Interview]

Essay of CPM member Zhang Taiyong

"In his essay in the 2013 book, Zhang disclosed that the CPM had transferred Lim from underground activities in the ABL to open front work. After Lim's explusion from the Chinese High School for his role in an examination boycott, he "continued his studies at an English-stream school but later accepted the organisation's decision and devoted himself to trade union movement and constitutional struggle." [Zhang Taiyong, "Our cohort's commander - Lu Yexun" in Mainstays of the Anti-Colonial Movement, p61] 

Retired Malaysian Special Branch officer Aloysius Chin

"the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police who held a long-standing watch over the communists in Malaya, also divulged that CPM leaders Siu Cheong and Ah Hoi cited Lim as an example of CPM members who were deployed in open front activities in political parties" [Aloysius Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya, The Inside Story, p67]

Documents in LCS' handwriting

"Two documents in Lim's own handwriting were among several he wrote for CPM records and for the instruction of recruits to the CPM who were under his leadership. One of them was on the talk he gave in the commemoration of Stalin's death. Another contained guidance notes for his ABL subordinates on the CPM's secret journal STUDY." 

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LKY's challenge to LCS after accusing him of being a communist

"Lim Chin Siong issued a signed statement accusing the prime minister of "sensationalism". To Lim's retort that he was "sick and tired" of having to deny association with communists, Lee Kuan Yew gave this risposte at a press conference on 27 January 1962: "If the documents were not written by him, he should deny it, sue me and the Government printers for libel and forgery." Lim never did. 

Click to enlarge

And former Director of Internal Security Branch, Yoong Siew Wah, when writing on his own blog noted the following:

"It was a well-known fact that Lim Chin Siong, the former general secretary of the powerful Singapore Factory & Shop Workers Union was the undisputed leader of the communist united front and controlled the mass base. Lee Kuan Yew could not have been unaware of this fact and knew that he had to depend on Lim Chin Siong and his mass base to advance his political ambition."

So while there are mentions in British archives to suggest that LCS was not a communist, it should be noted that those who say otherwise are aplenty.  

All hail the reprint of Battle for Merger?

So it seems all men are cowed by ElderLee, even as he is old, frail and distant...

When the Battle for Merger was relaunched, I was looking forward to a battle for ideas and interpretations between old thoughts and new revisions. So maybe I was a little disappointed when the new wave of revisionists treated the reprint with almost equal delight. From their previous arguments that there was no communist conspiracy and no red star over leftist politics in Singapore, and that LKY/PAP essentially jailed the political opposition, I was quite surprised that they did not urge caution over One Lee's view of things.

Side note: BfM is a primary source because LKY was an actor. I am not sure if you would call the works of Tim Harper, Hong Lysa and Geoff Wade primary sources.

Previously, I had written about the special acquaintance between communist boss Fong Chong Pik (or Fang Chung Pi) and Lim Chin Siong, and the Battle for Merger presents more details of Fang as the hand that rocks the cradle. According to BfM (read Albert Lau article appended below), Fang was the one who instructed Lim to thwart the plans of Merger after Tunku Abdul Rahman announced that it was possible that Singapore and the Borneo territories gained independence thru Merger.

Next, Fang met Lim after the Anson by-election and immediately before the Eden Hall Tea Party, the exact details were unknown. Again, according to BfM, it was a British ploy (during Eden Hall) to trick Lim into believing that they would have an equal chance to form the government if they guaranteed British military bases. After which, Lim had the confidence to began his open warfare with LKY, resulting in an open split of the PAP and the forming of Barisan Sosialis. LKY later pressed that it was Fang that gave the instruction for all communists to leave PAP and join BS. The resulting exodus was 19 of the 23 PAP organising secretaries and 60-70% of the PAP membership leaving to join BS.

Now it was interesting to read that LKY could say this of Fang and Lim with such accuracy and details (and not encounter strong resistance). Did he have access to the files of Special Branch who were definitely conducting surveillance on communist operatives in Singapore. Or access to other foreign intelligence services such as the Brits and Yankees who were informing him of the communist underground?     

On the question of whether Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan were communists, it was interesting to read another book, Singapore: A Biography, who also drew on British sources regarding the Eden Hall Tea Party. It showed that Lim and Fong couldn't answer for themselves when asked point blank if they were communists:

OUR TEXT (from page 396):

Still mulling over their response to the merger discussions, Lim, Fong, Woodhull and Puthucheary (following a phone enquiry from the latter) went to see Lord Selkirk ... at his Eden Hall Residence. They asked him point-blank whether the British would arrest them and suspend Singapore's constitution should Lee Kuan Yew be voted out of office. Selkirk replied that the constitution was a fair one which the British would respect, as long as any new party stuck to constitutional means and refrained from violence.

OUR ENDNOTE:

See Stockwell (ed.), pp. 145-147. Often the second part of this conversation is overlooked. Apparently, Selkirk then told his guests that for Singapore to survive it would need economic stability and he asked Lim and Fong whether they were communists. The Colonial Office report of the meeting reads: 'They [Lim and Fong] seemed to be embarrassed by this question and failed to give a clear reply. Mr Woodhull, on the other hand, stated categorically that he was not a communist.'

I've long been intrigued by why Lim and Fong, at this critical moment, 'failed to give a clear reply' to Selkirk's question and why they suddenly 'seemed to be embarrassed'. Only a little while later, Lim would make a categorical statement in front of the press that he was 'not a communist, or a communist front-man, or for that matter anybody's front-man'. So why were he and Fong so tongue-tied when talking to Selkirk back at Eden Hall?

************************

HIGH STAKES TALK  

By Albert Lau


The year was 1961. One Wednesday evening in September, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew took to the airwaves to begin the first of his "fireside" chats to the people. There was as yet no television, which was still 17 months away from putting out its pilot broadcast.

So radio was used.

At first glance, there seemed nothing unusual about the Prime Minister making a radio broadcast. Except that in the space of less than a month, Mr Lee would make an unprecedented 11 more broadcasts in a row over Radio Singapore, each within days of the other, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. Even more remarkable, the Prime Minister would relay each broadcast in three languages - English, Malay and Mandarin - to reach the widest audience.

These 12 talks were no ordinary radio broadcasts. Aired between Sept 13 and Oct 9, they were in fact the opening shots in what would soon become a keenly fought battle for the hearts and minds of the people of Singapore.

The immediate context was a referendum that Mr Lee's People's Action Party (PAP) Government intended to hold in a year's time to decide on a matter that would vitally affect the lives of the people on the island: merger with Malaya.

However, behind Mr Lee's "battle for merger" lay a related - but no less important - purpose: He wanted to expose the conspiracy of his shadowy communist opponents and their proxies to prevent merger. The stakes for the Prime Minister could not be any higher. If merger failed, not only would the outlook for his non-communist government be in jeopardy, but the future of Singapore also could possibly take a dramatically different turn - not necessarily for the better...

The communist conspiracy

RIGHT from the start, the PAP had communist and pro-communist elements within the party. In their desire to form a mass-based anti-colonial political party in 1954, the English-educated non-communist founders of the PAP solicited the help of Chinese-educated communist and pro-communist activists, like trade union leaders Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan, to bridge the gap to the majority Chinese-educated world.

By then, the outlawed Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had all but lost the jungle war; a disappointing setback that prompted its secretary-general, Chin Peng, to leave his jungle hideout and meet Tunku Abdul Rahman to discuss the latter's amnesty terms at the historic Baling talks in December 1955.

Though agreement was not reached at Baling, the failure of its guerilla campaign in the Federation (of Malaya) had left the MCP with no practical option but to defer its goal of a united communist Malaya for an indefinite period and settle on achieving socialism in a smaller place - Singapore.

To pursue its anti-colonial activism in this new urban setting, the MCP needed a legitimate left-wing political party to provide cover for its subversive activities and it found willing collaborators in the PAP's English-educated leaders.

Thus, for reasons of mutual political expediency, the two groups were able to forge a united front.

Collaboration, however, had its hazards, for the communists and pro-communists the PAP attracted soon endeavoured on numerous occasions - famously in May-June 1955 and October 1956 - to enmesh the party in supporting or condoning their advocacy of forceful mass agitation, using the Chinese-educated middle school students as their shock troops and their control of strategic trade unions to precipitate widespread industrial action accompanied by debilitating riots.

To deny the British and the Labour Front government of (David) Marshall and his successor, Lim Yew Hock, a pretext for smashing the party, the PAP's non-communist leaders had to publicly disassociate themselves on numerous occasions from the rough tactics of their pro-communist associates...

The more critical dilemma facing the united front, however, lay in the two groups' conflicting attitudes towards merger. From its founding, the PAP's objective had always been to take Singapore into Malaya. When the PAP formed the government in 1959, the goal of "independence through merger" was pursued unwaveringly as the next logical constitutional step for Singapore.

This, however, was not in the interests of the communists. After Malaya was granted independence in 1957, the MCP had lost its raison d'etre as far as anti-colonial agitation in the Federation was concerned. Only Singapore, which was still in a semi-colonial state, offered the communists scope for continuing their anti-imperialist struggle. For this reason they opposed the PAP's strategy of "independence through merger".

A Singapore independent together with the rest of Malaya would make it more difficult for the communists to camouflage their battle on behalf of communism as an anti-colonial struggle.

Moreover, merger would also mean placing internal security in the hands of a rabidly anti-communist Kuala Lumpur government, which had since 1959 shared joint custody over Singapore's internal security through its participation in the Internal Security Council (ISC) with Britain and Singapore.

The Federation government would certainly spare no effort to put down the communists on the island. But even though the extreme left-wing in the PAP fundamentally opposed merger, they were willing, for the sake of the united front, to pay lip service to it - at least so long as the possibility of fusion remained remote.

This state of uneasy tension remained until May 1961. The Tunku's Malaysia announcement, however, fundamentally changed all that. Once merger became a genuine prospect, the communists took alarm. Within days of the Malayan leader's speech, Lim Chin Siong conferred with Fang Chuang Pi, one of the communists' top three leaders overseeing Singapore and known to Mr Lee, who met him furtively on several occasions, as "the Plen" (for plenipotentiary).

Beginning in June, the extreme left came out openly to oppose merger. Through six leading trade unionists led by Lim, and backed by some 42 unions in a show of force, the pro-communists obliquely threatened to withhold support for the PAP candidate in the July 15 Anson by-election (occasioned by the death of a PAP assemblyman) unless the CEC substituted its "independence through merger" line for the communists' agenda of "complete internal self-government", that is, without the ISC. When the PAP leaders refused and proclaimed unequivocally their commitment to achieve "independence through merger" by 1963, a war of words ensued, with escalating intensity as both sides exchanged blow for blow, knowing full well that it would lead either to one side or the other giving in, or to a complete break. Meanwhile, Lim had been luring disaffected assemblymen to his side for the purpose of assembling a shadow team ready to capture the PAP and take office.

Two days before polling day, eight dissenting PAP assemblymen, led by Dr Lee Siew Choh, came out openly to denounce the party leadership and throw their support behind the trade unionists. Lim also threw his weight behind the Workers' Party candidate, David Marshall, who went on to win Anson by a narrow margin.

On July 16, a day after the PAP lost Anson, Fang Chuang Pi again conferred secretly with Lim Chin Siong. Two days later, an urgent approach was made to see Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner, who invited a pro-communist group, which included Lim and three others, for tea the same day. In his radio talks, Mr Lee subsequently charged that the British, with consummate skill, had deliberately tricked Lim and his radical group into open conflict with the PAP moderates by giving them the impression during their meeting at the UK Commissioner's residence on July 18 that if they left the British bases alone, they could form the government, provided they acquired power constitutionally.

Confronted by such treachery, Mr Lee called for a vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly on July 20, five days after the polls, before Lim could win over more assemblymen. The debate lasted until the pre-dawn hours of July 21. When the vote was taken, 26 PAP assemblymen and one independent supported the Government against eight who opposed the motion. There were 16 abstentions, 13 of which were by PAP assemblymen. The delaying tactics of the pro-communists to gain time for more defections failed.

After the meeting, Mr Lee proceeded to break up the united front and expelled the 13 PAP assemblymen who abstained. Fang Chuang Pi then instructed all communist members to leave the PAP and form a new proxy political party. Six days later, they launched the Barisan Sosialis, which was officially registered on Aug 13, with Dr Lee Siew Choh as chairman and Lim Chin Siong as secretary- general. Some 19 of the 23 organising secretaries in the various PAP branches and possibly 60 to 70 per cent of the PAP membership crossed over to the new party.

Not all who defected were communists or pro-communists. Some thought the days of the PAP were numbered and wanted to join the winning side. At this stage, the PAP was in the doldrums. It had lost two by-elections in succession. Its organisation was shattered. And, in the Assembly, its position had become precarious in the extreme, clinging on to power by a majority of one.

Nevertheless, the abrupt ending of its united front with the communists gave the PAP the clean slate it needed to rebuild the party from scratch, this time without communist influence.

- See more at: http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/the-battle-merger/story/high-stakes-talks-20141011#sthash.uJhK6eGk.dpuf

Govt fears amnesia as Battle for Merger goes for reprint

As the government machinery goes up a gear to promote the latest launch of Battle for Merger, maybe we should slow down and think why we have come to this juncture where the government frets that Singaporeans will one day forget our roots, and how historical debates are only the concern of a very very small group interested persons.

Yes, materialism is one main reason because of how our small island state has been tuned to survive through economic relevance in the global markets. Another reason is really because the education system has been giving local history a stale treatment, explaining how each stage of  historical socio-economic development was lacking until PAP came along. I am sure all A level history students can attest how histories of China, India and modern Europe was much more interesting than local history.

The last reason, which could be also the most damning, is that Singaporeans simply can't be bothered to learn their own history, and easily accepts what is presented to them. PAP supporters would want to believe that the communist threat was so violent that it was only through Lee's grace that extermination of the communists was not carried out. Conversely, many in the opposition chuckle at the "communist conspiracy" and take the view LKY was merely using the ISA to jail the opposition. If only historical truth was this simple duality...

The Battle for Merger was actually a series of 12 radio talks given by Mr LKY in 1961 in English, Malay and Mandarin. He argued that the Malayan Communist Party had used violence and sought to prevent the merger of Singapore with Malaya.

But if one is interested, especially those who read noveau interpretations of history and get all excited, they would find that the series of 12 radio talk that spoke on the dangers of the Communist Party of Malaya and the Communist United Front, were in fact all along available for listeners from the national archives websites, at no charge. They only needed your time and attention

But why should anyone read what this man has to say? Well, if one desires to get as close as possible to a historical truth, one should read and analyse from a variety of sources and not just depend on British, American or Communist sources to tell a version of events. Although I am quite sure some are just quite dismissive of Mr LKY because of what they went through under him rather than what they read of him. But surely it is important to read what he has to say if you want to understand the historical circumstances of Singapore, because LKY was one of the main actor.

And the main reason why you should read (but you may not agree) is the fact that after all has been said and done, an large majority of Singaporeans, at that time (in 59, 63 and 68) voted PAP/LKY into power, believed in their ideology and trusted the PAP with their livelihoods. You may argue that LKY won because he removed the opposition, but the same could be argued that if the support for opposition was so strong, they would have spoiled the votes, revolted and protested in the streets...but they did not. It passed its test of legitimacy although not with flying colours, some might argue.

A compelling point to remember when reading this book is - to argue his points, LKY, (in 1961, still not all-powerful as he would be in 1965), was very open about his personal encounters with British officials, the UMNO politicians, the Communists, the Leftists and even his own colleagues - and to date, there has been no noteworthy contestations to the version of events as he presented it.

For example, in The Battle for Merger, LKY shared a thereafter oft-quoted story where he met the PLEN, otherwise known as Fong Chong Pik, a powerful representative of the Communist Party of Malaya, in 1958. The PLEN was proposing that the PAP work together the CPM to form an anti-colonial united front. LKY was hesitant as the communists then were lending their support to David Marshall's Workers' Party. To verify that the PLEN was as powerful as he claimed, LKY asked the PLEN to prove his good faith by asking pro-Communist trade unionist Chang Yuen Tong to resign from the WP and City Council, so that David Marshall and WP can go on their own without communist support. Several weeks later, Chang Yuen Tong did just that. The PLEN had proven his credentials. And WP failed miserably in the 1959 elections.

Now, you might ask, how does that square with the latest assertions that trade unionists and politicians arrested during 1963 were not communists but merely leftists? Was Chang a lone wolf or just one of the many communist-inspired pawns that CPM could move? If so, who were those keeping their allegiances and associations secret?   

Another example, in 1959, after LKY secured the release of Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, Fong Swee Suan, Sidney Woodhull, James Puthucheary and Chan Chiaw Thor, (who were detained by the Labour Front and Brits for suspected communist activities), all except for Lim told to LKY that they not again let CPM make use of the PAP. They declared that if the CPM fought the PAP because of this, they would fight with the PAP against the CPM. To this end, they signed a declaration renouncing communism.    

So, if the assertion is that Lim Chin Siong was not communist, why did he not make the same gentleman's agreement like the rest of the above stated leftists? Another historical riddle rings up the register...

In conclusion, as we reaped what they have sown, as those who went before us slowly wither, as our genesis sometimes seemed more like a bad dream, I think it is ever so important for those who care about Singapore's history to pick up this book and read about the people, deeds and events of that era before coming to a conclusion. 

   

A portrait of the struggling life of Chiam Chong Chian

The following is a loose translation of the biography of Chiam Chong Chian, who was an underground CPM cadre leader in Malaya during the 1950s.

Born in Kuantan, Pahang, Malaya in 1931, Chiam Chong Chian was a Malayan son that died on PRC soil because of the tumultuous struggle for independence and the battle between nationalists and communism during the 1950s and 1960s.

Chiam was the third child in a Hainanese family of six children. His father came to Malaya at the end of the 19th century, first becoming a baker and later a plantation supervisor.

Chiam was only 11 or 12 when the Japanese invaded Malaya during WWII. During that time, Chiam followed his family to hide in jungle and began to lived off the land. He joined the adults in hunting, fishing and delivering supplies while entertainment was Chinese classic stories of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin.

In 1946, after the war had ended, Chiam returned to school in Kuantan and a year later enrolled in Chinese High Singapore. Not only were Chiam's results good, he was also charismatic and well-liked by fellow students. He was surrounded by a group of close friends who would later become his comrades. Many of these friends would later end up as liaison officials (with overseas Chinese) in China after the Chinese Communists took power.

1950 was a watershed year for Chiam who was senior high year 2. There was a surge in anti-colonial sentiments and seniors like him began to infect the younger ones in Chinese High with the need for Malaya's independence.

As the waves of anti-colonialism continued unabated, authorities began the clamp down of student activism with the closing of Chinese High, shutting down of student organizations, arresting progressive teachers and students and the expulsion of 50 senior high school student activists with Chiam being one of them.

On May 31, 1950, when military police surrounded the school to arrest them, Chiam was hidden in the school canteen by student sympathizers and managed to escape the school. As the surrounding area of Chinese High were houses of wealthy residents who typically employed Hainanese as housekeepers, Chiam was able to escape the dragnet by seeking help from his kinsmen.

From then on, Chiam bade farewell to his student life and joined the communist underground to battle against the British colonial power and achieve independence for Malaya.

In 1951, Chiam returned to Kuantan to teach in a primary school. He was humble, well-liked and earned the respect of the students. On the side, Chiam continued to work for the Communist Party of Malaya and received instructions to carry out reporting and research for the party.

In 1952, Chiam began to be tasked by the party to carry out organization work and operations. As he was passionate, responsible and honest, he was trusted by the party and began to take on more responsibilities. Under Chiam's leadership, the political environment began to open up and progress was made with mobilization of the masses.

In the early 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew began to work in cahoots with the British colonial power to exterminate the communists. Chiam was forced under these circumstances to escape to Indonesia.

When in Indonesia, he faced immense difficulties as he was unfamiliar with the country and did not speak the language. The 30 Sep 1965 purging of the Communists, where tens of thousands of Indonesian Communists were killed by the Indonesian military, made his situation increasingly unbearable.

To exacerbate matters, Cultural Revolution erupted in China and Chiam was criticized for his previous actions. He was criticized for his wrongdoings, forced to apologized and ostracized from the party. But he was said to be steadfast and hung on to his beliefs, never betrayed his comrades even though he was exiled from the party and lead a precarious life.

The only consolation Chiam had was in the mid-1990s when CPM leader Chin Peng met Chiam in a Guangzhou hotel. Chin reverted previous criticisms of Chiam and reaffirmed Chiam's lifetime commitment to the Communist cause.

Chiam passed away on Apr 26, 1998, due to multiple illnesses. He was 68 years old.

Revising the Revisionists: Operation Coldstore in History

The battle of the minds on Singapore's early Independence history is heating up. After Dr. Thum Ping Tjin's recent assertion that Operation Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise by the PAP to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition in Singapore, another academic Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna has come out questioning Thum's position and research on the issue. This crossing of swords between Singapore's intelligentsia is exciting to say the least and will help in the recovery of Singapore's historical amnesia. 

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The recent controversy over the Indonesian navy’s decision to name a vessel after two marines that had bombed MacDonald House in Singapore on 10 March 1965 is revealing. It has reinforced philosopher George Santayana’s quip that those who cannot remember the past will be condemned to repeat it. The action by the two bombers, Osman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said, killed three Singaporeans and injured 33 others, and was part of the low-intensity war known to posterity as Confrontation. 

This campaign was waged by the left-leaning Indonesian President Sukarno against what he regarded as a British ‘neo-colonial’ challenge to his designs for regional supremacy: the newly inaugurated Federation of Malaysia, which at the time included Singapore. Particularly telling was how much effort the media and several ministers had to invest to enlighten Singaporeans as to why the Indonesian decision was injurious to Singapore’s national dignity. Such collective historical amnesia is not exactly healthy as it renders the body politic vulnerable to distorted versions of defining episodes in our history.

Case in point is another historical episode from the tumultuous 1960s that has received rather sensationalistic treatment recently: the internal security action called Operation Coldstore on 2 February 1963, two years before the MacDonald House bombing. History records that Coldstore was mounted to contain the threat to Singapore’s security posed by the Communist United Front then dominating key interest groups. 

Now Ping Tjin Thum (P.J. Thum), a young Singaporean historian, disputes this. He argues instead that Coldstore represented a blatantly political exercise to destroy the legitimate ‘progressive left wing’ opposition that had hitherto offered the only credible electoral challenge to Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP).

This is a good story. But reality was not that straightforward. 

The Context

By the late 1950s, in the midst of the Cold War and post-war decolonization, the British Colonial Office sought to transfer power to local governments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore that would be anti-Communist and friendly to Western geostrategic interests. British Commonwealth forces were meanwhile engaged in a shooting war with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in the jungles of that country. 

South of the Causeway a strong Communist United Front (CUF) had penetrated the Chinese-educated workers’ and students’ associations, as well as the left-wing political party, the PAP, that seemed most likely to win the election for limited self-government in 1959. The British feared that the CUF would ultimately overwhelm the English-educated PAP leadership led by Lee, turning Singapore into a Communist-dominated ‘second Cuba’ in the heart of maritime Southeast Asia.

The Colonial Office in London and Lee hence sought to persuade the politically conservative Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to overcome his fear of upsetting Malay political dominance and power in Malaya with the absorption of Singapore Chinese. To resolve the racial equation, they proposed that the island be absorbed into an expanded Malay Federation that would include the British Borneo territories as well.  The geopolitical calculus was that with control of Singapore’s internal security vested in a staunchly anti-Communist central government in Kuala Lumpur the CPM would be severely curtailed. 

Hence Singapore would develop within the Federation framework in the desired pro-Western, anti-Communist direction.  Because Tunku insisted that Merger with Singapore required its Communists to be first brought to heel, Coldstore was mounted in February 1963. Eight months later, in September, Singapore achieved full independence from the United Kingdom as part of the Federation of Malaysia.

Thum’s Perspective

Thum now appears to question this standard security-driven narrative of Coldstore. His ‘revisionist’ interpretation focuses on PAP leader Lee’s supposed obsession with power and determination to destroy his closest political rival, the charismatic Chinese-speaking ‘progressive leftist’ Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues in the PAP, the unions and other interest associations. 

By late 1962 the supremely crafty Lee had apparently manipulated the British and Tunku into a corner.  In particular, Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore, expressed misgivings that the list of individuals that Lee wanted detained seemed to be targeted simply for being in political opposition.  

Lim Chin Siong especially seemed to be fingered not because of security reasons but because Lee wanted him arrested so that the PAP would win the upcoming general elections. Because the political clock was ticking away, Tunku warned the British in January 1963 that if the Chinese-educated political left in Singapore were not locked away, Merger would be off. An anxious Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys in London thus overruled the objections of Selkirk and Coldstore went ahead.  Politics had trumped security.

Reality Check

There are two main problems with Thum’s argument. First, he argues – citing Selkirk’s contemporaneous concerns - that at the time of Coldstore there was no direct evidence that Lim Chin Siong and other detainees were engaged in actual Communist subversion.  But the records do show that even careful British officials conceded that Lim was a skilful CUF operative and other detainees possessed a recent history of subversive activities. 

Tunku also agreed that the detentions on preventive grounds were necessary. This was prudent. CPM elements within the utterly penetrated Barisan Socialis that was challenging the PAP for power never ruled out switching strategy to armed violence at any time. Historian T.N. Harper hence considers Selkirk’s attempted distinction between ‘political’ and ‘security’ grounds for detention as ‘problematic’. 

Second, Thum emphasizes how Tunku and Selkirk disliked Lee’s personality and byzantine political machinations. But CUF leaders – said to possess ‘animal cunning’ themselves – in fact regarded the tactically agile Lee as the only serious obstacle to their plans to establish Communist rule in Singapore. British envoy in Kuala Lumpur Geofroy Tory sympathized with Lee’s position, warning that playing by ‘Queensbury rules’ with the unscrupulous Communists would be folly.  

Ultimately, cautious British officials in Singapore conceded that in view of what historian S. J. Ball called the ‘ruthless, fast-moving and mendacious’ nature of local politics at the time, Lee Kuan Yew, warts and all, was ‘the only man who can run this city’.

Revising Revisionism

Singapore celebrates its 50th national birthday next year and the nation seems to be in ‘mid-life crisis’, grappling with issues like immigration, national identity and political change. In this light, the appearance of revisionist historical accounts – aided and abetted by the historical amnesia Santayana warned about - is unsurprising.  Nevertheless, perhaps one positive step to begin salving the national mood is more extensive, innovative and creative public education efforts to promote a greater appreciation for and knowledge of our history. 

As part of this process, Operation Coldstore itself must be seen in context – it occurred during a difficult episode in our history amidst a genuinely dangerous period in the Cold War, as evidenced by the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, ongoing advances made by communists in Indochina, the Brunei revolt in December 1962, and of course the Indonesian Konfrontasi from January 1963.  

The revisionist view that Coldstore was utterly driven by Lee’s obsession with political power is hence misleading. A more nuanced analysis suggests that reality at the time was defined by morally complex shades of grey.  Ultimately, following Machiavelli, the moral test of tough policy choices must be whether they benefit a nation in the long run. Fifty-one years on, even critics concede that Singapore has blossomed into a cosmopolitan, politically stable and economically vibrant metropolis. History would therefore - on balance – very likely adjudge that Coldstore passed this test.

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Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Nanyang Technological University. A historian by background, he has published extensively on the struggle against post-war Malayan Communism. He is working on a longer scholarly analysis of Operation Coldstore.